




Gazette

JULY, 1947

30c



This Month's Cover

✠ BACK IN THE DAYS before fiber helmets, master sergeants, and SSNs, there was a breed in the Marine Corps known to the files as "Gunny." He was a man of dignity, this "Gunny," and had the Marine Corps Manual in his head, a ramrod down his back, and authority in his voice. He's still around, here and there, but mostly he wears bars and leaves instead of chevrons. For more in this sentimental vein, see *Thin Line of Tradition*, page 18.

THE MARINE CORPS GAZETTE

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
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
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PASSING IN REVIEW

BOOKS OF INTEREST TO MARINE READERS

The Profession of Arms . . .

Since it began last May, "Passing in Review" has presented short reviews of new books that we thought would be "of interest to Marine readers." We are now going to broaden the department a bit at the base. In addition to specific reviews of new books there is going to be a more general comment on books and their relation to men at arms. This new column will be conducted by Maj Phillips D. Carleton, USMCR, distinguished historian and man of letters. He outlines the scope of the new feature in the paragraphs below:

In peacetime a new Corps faces responsibilities greater than it has ever known. Once its energies and talents were angled toward the Caribbean and one or two cities in China. Now with its unique mission, it faces outward toward all quarters of the globe. It is equipped to face these new responsibilities: newly reorganized, with stripped administrative headquarters and self-sufficient fighting units, it has adequate strength to accomplish any duties it is called upon to perform.

Under these circumstances, it is proposed to include in the GAZETTE from time to time this column which will review or discuss books pertaining to the profession of arms rather than to strictly military matters. Emphatically this column is not to be used as an excuse for introducing discussion of general literature or for competing with the reviews appearing in civilian magazines, nor shall it introduce subjects at all discordant with the matter appearing in other pages of the magazine.

The Marine officer has the wide and difficult field of military science to master, tactics to study, constant and rigorous training to undergo. These things are his stock in trade, the very essentials of his life. The Marine officer, however, has a large responsibility as a member of one of the few truly professional military bodies in the world: *to view the world as a professional man.*

The object of this column is to introduce reviews or discussions of a series of books that are pertinent or interesting to military readers. Reviews of these books are, of course, available elsewhere. Such a book as *United States at War*, a study of the rise of the civilian war agencies, has had considerable attention in the magazines and newspapers. *Arsenal of Democracy*, the unofficial account of industrial mobilization by Donald M. Nelson, Chairman of the War Production Board, has been widely commented on. The point is, however, that these are comments by civilians about civilian agencies. This column will approach these same books from an entirely different point of view. What are the implications of these facts for the Armed Services, in particular for the Marine Corps?

That is one aspect of the column. Another will be the selection from a wide range of books of material that is of importance to military study. Public Administration and Military Administration work in parallel fields, but there has been surprisingly little interchange of knowledge between the two areas—more perhaps since the war because of the return of men to civilian life from high position in the services and because of the appointment of such a man as MajGen Graves B. Erskine to the head of a civilian agency. A work such as the recent condensation of Toynbee's *Study of Civilization* has important things to say on what wars have done to civilization. Fedotov White's *Growth of the Red Army* is a serious historical study. Much of what he has to say on Russian problems in building an army according to new dictates is exceedingly pertinent.

These are tentative suggestions. But under the aegis of the column the range of subjects and the range of experts who will be called upon are large. Recency of publication will be no criterion of choice for comment; and experts in various fields will have a chance to set forth their views.

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tist and shows no military bias, considering the amazing military achievements of the Germans under incredibly adverse conditions subsequent to World War I, he as the victor, does seem to depreciate somewhat their scientific and industrial achievements, and particularly their organization. CRB

Mountain Men . . .

THE BIG SKY—A. B. Guthrie, Jr. 386 pages. New York: William Sloane Associates. \$3.50.

This is the story of the opening of the West—from the Mississippi to the Rockies and further—by that strange breed of men, the fur trappers and traders, who preceded the gold seekers, the cattlemen, and dirt farmers. It is also an allegory of men who find their own paradise and then restlessly destroy it.

Boone Caudill is a synthesis of Kit Carson, Jim Bridger, Hugh Glass, and others who roamed the wide new West during the period between our last war with the British and our first war with the Mexicans. He has all the frontier virtues and vices. *The Big Sky*, rather than a novel, is half a biography, half a saga, of his wanderings. EHS

Teutonic Method . . .

GERMAN RESEARCH IN WORLD WAR II—Col Leslie E. Simon, USA, 218 pages, illustrated. New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc. \$4.00

An interesting study of German effort in basic and technical research, design, and development during the Nazi era. The author, Col Leslie E. Simon, Ordnance Department, and Director of the Ballistic Research Laboratories, Aberdeen Proving Ground, has shown how remarkably deficient the Hitler dictatorship was in planning and leading its research, implementing development, and gauging its needs for a variety of contingencies—this, in spite of the almost unbelievable German patience, thoroughness, craftsmanship, and scientific know how.

Col Simon's book, coming at a time when our government is laying the ground work for peacetime research, will prove valuable to physicists, airmen, ordnance men, and those engaged in the field of guided missiles. There are only two criticisms of Col Simon's work. The title is a bit misleading and does not conform exactly with the content. Although he writes as a scien-

Adventures in Eating . . .

A MAN AND HIS MEALS—Fletcher Pratt and Robeson Bailey. 251 pages, illustrated. New York: Henry Holt and Company \$2.50

With the idea that military men may sometimes be interested in food for non-military reasons, we refer you to this book about meals written jointly by a frequent GAZETTE contributor and a teacher of English at Smith College. Essentially a cookbook, it yet is as different from the ordinary cookbook as Fowler's *Dictionary of Modern English Usage* is from Webster's *Dictionary*. Messrs Pratt and Bailey give you not only the list of ingredients for almost any dish you might fancy, but also tell you (in amusing and readable prose) how to prepare it, how to serve it, and what to serve with it.

As the title suggests, the book is definitely slanted toward the male tastes: disciples of Fanny Farmer may find it too strong and too simple. HS

THE MARINE CORPS **Gazette**

THE PROFESSIONAL MAGAZINE
FOR UNITED STATES MARINES

JULY 1947

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This Month and Next

☛ THIS MONTH'S GAZETTE should look bigger and brighter: we've added eight more pages and inside color. This is our way of acknowledging our steadily climbing circulation. It is a truism but we will repeat it anyway: the greater the circulation, the better the magazine; the better the magazine, the greater the circulation.

Also we can't resist plugging the color reprints of the Lovell-Clymer historical series, which are once again available. We can't think of more appropriate pictures for your office, recreation room, or study. See our ad on page 72.

☛ NOTE TO JUNIOR OFFICERS AND SENIOR

NCOs: The GAZETTE is very much in the market for small unit action stories. In the last few months we have published several that were written at the company level. We would like to get down to the platoon and even squad level. If there is an unique experience that sticks in your mind, put it down on paper—it may be worth money to you.

☛ OPERATION MARKET was the greatest airborne attack in history. Next month LT COL WARREN E. SWEETSER, JR., tells in detail one battalion's experiences when it dropped down on Holland. The story is *Dustpan and Broom*.

REVISED CONSTITUTION
of
THE UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
ASSOCIATION

Article I

NAME AND PURPOSE

The name of this society shall be the United States Marine Corps Association. The purposes for which the Association is formed are to disseminate knowledge of the military art and science among its members, and to provide for their professional advancement; to foster the spirit and preserve the traditions of the United States Marine Corps; to increase the efficiency thereof; and to further the interests of the military and naval services in all ways not inconsistent with the good of the general Government.

Article II

MEMBERSHIP

Section 1: Regular Members.

Any member of the armed services of the United States or any former member separated under honorable conditions from these services shall be eligible for membership in the Association upon application to the Secretary and Treasurer of the Association and upon payment of such annual dues as may from time to time be established by the Board of Governors. Regular membership shall not include the right to vote.

Section 2: Governing Members.

Governing members shall consist of the following officers of the United States Marine Corps:

Commandant of the Marine Corps
Director, Division of Plans and Policies
Director, Division of Public Relations
Director, Division of Aviation
Commandant of the Marine Corps Schools
Secretary and Treasurer of the Marine Corps Association.

Governing members shall have the same rights as regular members, but in addition, have the right to vote on all questions coming before the Board of Governors of the Association as hereinafter provided.

Section 3: Disposition of Funds.

No part of the Association's revenues or income shall accrue to the benefit of any member or governing member as such, and any and all excess of income over expenses shall be held in reserve for later use as needed in the furtherance of the objects of the Association.

Article III

THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS

Section 1: Membership of Board.

The Board of Governors shall consist of all governing members.

Section 2: Meeting of Board.

Regular meetings shall be held not less frequently than once each year at such time and place as the President upon recommendation of the Secretary and Treasurer shall from time to time determine and upon such notice as he deems sufficient. Special meetings may be called by the President in the same manner. Presence in person or by proxy of a majority shall constitute a quorum. All meetings shall be governed by Robert's Rules of Order when not in conflict with this Constitution.

Section 3: Action by Unanimous Written Consent.

If a majority of the Board of Governors shall severally or collectively consent in writing to any action to be taken by the Association, such action shall be as valid as though it has been authorized at a meeting of the Board.

Section 4: Powers of the Board.

(a) General Powers: The control and management of the affairs and funds of the Association shall be in the hands of the Board which shall have full power to do any act convenient, necessary, or proper to effectuate the objects of the Association. The Board shall serve without compensation. It may purchase, take, receive, hold, sell, exchange, mortgage, pledge, convey, or transfer any or all real or personal property, tangible or intangible, when deemed to be necessary or desirable in the furtherance of the objects of the Association.

(b) To Incur Obligations: The Board shall have the power to incur such indebtedness as may be necessary and desirable.

(c) To Authorize Signatures and Fix Bonds: The Board shall determine who is authorized on the Association's behalf to sign bills, receipts, endorsements, drafts, acceptances, promissory notes, endorsements for deposits with any duly authorized depositories, checks, releases, contracts, documents, and other legal instruments; and shall have the power to require and fix the amount of bond of any officers or employee of the Association. When the execution of any contract, conveyance, or other instrument has been authorized without specification of the executing

officers, the Secretary and Treasurer may execute the same.

(d) To Amend the Constitution: The Board shall have the power to make, repeal, and amend the Constitution by majority vote.

Article IV

OFFICERS

Section 1: Designation of Officers.

The officers of this Association shall consist of a President and a Secretary and Treasurer.

Section 2: The President.

The Commandant of the Marine Corps shall be the President of the Association. He shall have general powers of supervision over the Association.

Section 3: The Secretary and Treasurer.

The Secretary and Treasurer shall be recommended by the Board of Governors and approved by the President. He shall control the general management of the business of the Association and see that all orders and resolutions of the Board are carried into effect. He shall be an *ex-officio* member of all committees and editor-in-chief of all publications by or under the direction of the Association. He shall attend all meetings of the Board. He shall give all notice required by statute or otherwise. He shall have the custody of all funds and securities and shall keep full and accurate accounts of all receipts and disbursements. He shall deposit all moneys, securities, and other valuable effects in the name of the Association in the duly authorized depositories. He shall make all proper disbursements, taking all proper vouchers therefor and shall render to the Board of Governors at its stated meetings, or whenever requested by the President of the Association, an account of all transactions as Treasurer and of the financial condition of the Association. The books of account of the Secretary and Treasurer shall be audited at least once a year by a Certified Public Accountant.

Section 4: Compensation.

Officers of the Association shall receive no compensation from the funds of the Association for their services.

Article V

THE MARINE CORPS GAZETTE

Section 1: General.

A periodical under the title of The Marine

Corps GAZETTE shall be published and distributed under the direction of the Secretary-Treasurer. The GAZETTE shall be dedicated to the furtherance of the objects of the Association, and shall be distributed to members of the Association and other persons interested in the purposes of the Association.

Section 2: Staff.

The Secretary and Treasurer of the Association shall be Editor-in-Chief of the GAZETTE. Other officers and enlisted personnel of the Marine Corps will be assigned, as required and available, to assist him in the publication and distribution of the magazine.

Section 3: The Editorial Board:

An Editorial Board, to consist of not less than four officers of field grade, may be designated by the Editor-in-Chief (subject to the approval of the Board of Governors). This board shall make recommendations to the Editor-in-Chief with respect to financial and business matters and editorial policy of the GAZETTE. Additionally, the board will review and approve all editorial matter appearing in the GAZETTE.

Section 4: Distribution.

A year's subscription to the GAZETTE shall be included with each annual membership in the Association. Subscriptions to the GAZETTE may also be sold to non-members who are interested in activities of the Association and the Marine Corps.

Section 5: GAZETTE BOOKSHOP.

A bookshop shall be maintained and operated by the GAZETTE. This shop will primarily be for the convenience of Association members, and a suitable discount will be allowed on sales to members.

Section 6: Profits.

All revenue from the GAZETTE and GAZETTE BOOKSHOP, over and above operating expenses, shall accrue to the Marine Corps Association.

Article VI

DISSOLUTION

If and when the Association is dissolved, all funds and assets remaining after the payment of the outstanding obligations shall be liquidated as directed by the President of the Marine Corps Association.

Approved by
Gen A. A. Vandegrift
2 May 1947



Why the Accent on Youth ?

ard items in the journalistic repertoire, along with the weather, sex, and mother love. The public may love the privates, corporals, and sergeants; it may even like some of the lieutenants and captains, but above that rank the military man is subject to the Code Napoleon—he stands guilty as indicted until he proves himself innocent.

The military stands uniquely alone among all the professions in the lack of respect, emulation, or praise it (or anyone else) renders its senior members. In law and jurisprudence, medicine, education, science, engineering, business and finance, the great and respected leaders of those professions are not found among the youngsters who are only travellers on the long road to eminence. The professional and public acclaim accorded to a Justice Holmes, an Albert Einstein,

a Harvey Cushing, a Nicholas Murray Butler, a Henry Ford, a J. P. Morgan—to mention but

♣ I DOUBT IF THERE EXISTS TODAY, IN ANY of the armed services, an officer over fifty years of age who is not denounced regularly by officers junior to him as a “stupid (dumb, mossbacked, doddering) old fogey.”

He is accused of all manner of heinous crimes against human intelligence and common sense.

Most prevalent among these crimes are: (a) believing that the airplane, tank, radar, aircraft carrier, *et al* are not here to stay, and that we should return to the good old days when the horse, Springfield rifle, and battleship were the backbone of national defense; (b) not having had a new idea in at least twenty years; and (c) being in his dotage.

Officers who are approaching or past fifty are condemned, not only as individuals by their juniors, but also as a group by the press and public. They are caricatured and berated as bureaucratic, red tape worshipping, inefficient brass hats, or pompous and incompetent Col Blimps. Chiding, flaying, or “exposing” the upper levels of the military hierarchy are stand-

By Maj L. R. Hale

Illustrated by Maj James A. Donovan, Jr.

a few well known leaders of the various professions—is reserved for men of long experience, mature wisdom, and proven ability. These leaders are further recognized as the great teachers of their professions, and fortunate indeed is the young man who can study under them in colleges or universities, or work under their direction in hospitals, laboratories, law offices, business offices, or factories. No such recognition is given to officers of similar experience or accomplishment in the military services.

A revealing example of this lack of confidence in the ability and capabilities of senior officers is to be found in the service schools. Few and far between on the staff rosters are the names of senior officers of long service and varied experi-

Junior officers fail to realize there is much to be learned from older officers with extensive service. Officer stagnation in the Marine Corps can be curbed with compulsory courses, by removing officers temporarily from service environment

ence. Instead it will be found that the "bright young officer," with all of ten or twelve years service, is much more prized as a teacher than the military sage, at whose feet the student might receive the lessons learned in a lifetime of service, study, and contemplation. It is ironical that the teachings and words of wisdom in a profession older than recorded history and which embraces more fields of human endeavor than any other profession are supposed to come from the mouths of babes and sucklings.

What degree of truth is there in these popularly held beliefs that the officers in the higher ranks, especially those who attain such rank during the periods between wars, are not mentally alert, progressive, and professionally competent to discharge the duties of their rank in time of war? Such a sweeping arraignment is obviously untrue. But is there a sufficiently large percentage of officers in this category to create a problem that requires corrective action? The records of promotion and duty assignment of officers during the war, and the postwar personnel policy of the services, is an admission that there is such a problem.

An evening spent in studying registers of officers for the various services can be startlingly enlightening as to the failure of many officers who rose to the senior grades in time of peace to be found fit for duty or promotion in time of war. Compare the lists of generals and admirals, and colonels and captains, in the 1940 registers (the last register before expansion and promotion incident to mobilization) with the registers of 1945. Note how many of these officers in the 1940 registers were either not promoted at all, or were promoted only once, while their juniors were later promoted over

them. For your own service, note how many of these officers listed in the 1940 register never held any important command or staff billet commensurate with his rank and experience, or else held such a billet only once and was then relegated to some minor administrative or command duty for the remainder of the war. It is painfully apparent that many of the officers who were our military leaders just before the war had sunk into obscurity by its end, to be replaced by officers risen from obscurity. This seems to be a chronic condition in our military establishment. The Grants, Pershings, and Eisenhowers of the final victory and their principal subordinate commanders, have not come from the officers whose pre-war rank supposedly qualified them for such high position and great responsibility.

THE LOUD and continuing postwar protestations of the services that henceforth we will have younger generals, admirals, colonels, and captains than ever before is a further manifestation that age and experience evidently did not produce satisfactory leaders in our prewar services. Since the war there have been countless official statements and proposed plans from the

... old war dogs shouldn't be wasted



services regarding their intentions and plans for advancing young officers rapidly, and giving them high rank relatively early in their careers. The words of the Autocrat of the Breakfast Table that, "Knowledge and timber should not be used until they are seasoned," have apparently been forgotten in the Atomic Age.

Both by official word and deed the prospect of a long and successful career in the services has been made both vague and hazardous. (Those highly esteemed bright young officers will invest heavily in 20 year endowment policies if they are as wise as reputed.) There have been forthright admissions that many of our senior officers were physically or mentally incapable of playing a responsible role in the past war. There have been recommendations that all officers over a certain age be retired right now to make way for the younger men.* The results so far of this attitude toward the older officers may be read in a comparison of a 1945 and a 1947 register of officers. The terrific mortality in the higher grades is almost solely due to the services' post-war attitude toward older officers—especially those without an excellent or outstanding war record. As a result of recent experience, the services seem to have embraced the hoary old aphorism that you can't teach old (war) dogs new tricks, and made it the slogan of a crusade to replace the greying head and leisurely step with the rosy cheek and brisk pace. In so doing they are grievously deluding themselves and the nation, for no popular fallacy has been exploded more often than that folklore observation on canine intelligence and adaptability.

Like many similar proverbs, that because of repetition and aptness are unthinkingly accepted as truth, this old troublemonger contains both truth and falsity. Its truth lies in the undeniable fact that countless persons have known many old dogs (or people) that couldn't be taught new tricks. Its falsity lies in the fact that the same dogs or people *could* have been taught new tricks if by education and training their minds had been kept active, receptive, and vigorous.

Having placed this old canard on a plane with the Nine Principles of War, the services have adopted the corrective measure of getting rid of all their old dogs, or else getting them out of

the young one's way. *Wouldn't it be a more sane, reasonable, economical, and humane approach to the problem to raise all the dogs in such a manner that when they are old they can still learn new tricks?* When the services have some particularly difficult and vexing tricks to learn (as they will in the years just ahead), wouldn't it be well to have plenty of wise, experienced, and cagey old war dogs around to lead, guide, and teach the pack of yelping, scrambling, immature hounds? To my callow mind the answer is a resounding "Yes!"

✿ THE CASE FOR PRESERVATION of the aging human mind (whether it be military or civilian) may be found in a recent and most readable book on the hazards and problems of senescence.* In a

*The Second Forty Years by Dr Edward J. Stieglitz, J. B. Lippincott Co. Senescence, which is the period of maturity, usually between 40 and 60 years of age, should not be confused with senility which begins somewhere between 60 and 75 years of age. During senescence the individual may be physically sound and is capable of mental growth. During senility, a decline of both physical and mental power is usually experienced.



*Age 40 seems to be the magic dividing line for separating the men from the boys. In the last decade it was a so widely proclaimed for a time in the industrial world as the password for turning workmen out to pasture, their usefulness supposedly ended. The terms "older" or "senior" officers are used hereafter to classify officers over 40 years of age.

chapter on the mental aspects of senescence, Dr Stieglitz reviews and presents in laymen's language the conclusive scientific evidence that there is no inevitable decline or retrogression in intellectual power incident to maturity. The imporous, wizened, inelastic mind that refuses to learn new tricks, or open to new ideas, need not be a symbol of increasing age. As Dr Stieglitz says, "The hair may stop growing, and the pate become a polished dome fringed with silver, but the mind below this shining cupola can continue to grow in understanding, wisdom, and appreciation of life." The brain, the same as any other organ or muscle of the human body, is subject to the fundamental biologic law that use promotes growth and development, disuse leads to atrophy and decay. The unadmirable qualities of mind found in so large a percentage of older people is the direct result of non-observance of this simple truth.

It is a tragic fact that our modern civilization does not require many of its members to

approach perfection, and soon the dry rot and atrophy of idleness sets in. The man who has taken no exercise for ten years cannot expect to go out and play several fast sets of tennis, run a mile, or climb a mountain. If he has also let his mind lie fallow he cannot expect to readily solve a difficult problem requiring intense, clear, original, logical thinking.

The true poet's instinctive insight into the human mind and heart often precedes or exceeds the reasoning and studies of the scientist. Over one hundred years ago one of them stated the facts in the case of the slothful mind far more briefly and clearly than any learned and prolix scientific study when she wrote:

*Though man a thinking being is defined,
Few use the grand prerogative of mind.
How few think justly of the thinking few!
How many never think, who think they do!*

In allowing his mental powers to stagnate or decline, the aging individual bars himself from acquiring one of the most priceless of all intel-

Countless junior officers have been exasperated by a senior's seeming reluctance to grasp a new idea. Loudly and bitterly they complain that older officers are still in the Springfield '03-campaign hat days; that they have had no new ideas for twenty years

think. Commentators, experts, critics, and other so-called authorities on every conceivable subject do our thinking for us, and we dutifully accept their oracular pronouncements which bombard us daily in the press, magazines, books, and on the radio. These shrewd individuals earn a rich living through canny exploitation of the old saying that, "There's no amount of trouble or effort the average man won't go through to avoid thinking." Or as Dr Stieglitz states it, "Exercise of the intelligence is mental work. This is the hardest and most exhausting type of labor." Our mechanized civilization has given us canned and frozen food, ready-made clothing, prefabricated dwellings, heat, light, and water at our finger tips, and effortless travel; now it offers its greatest triumph—opinions and conclusions in abundance, neatly packaged and labeled, and readily assimilable by the meanest intellect.

In a society that requires only superficial thinking from the great mass of its members, the mind of the average individual begins to fall into disuse soon after completion of his formal education. Forgotten is the fact that the mind requires constant practice if it is to achieve or

lectual qualities—judgment. It is the capacity for judgment, which is the sum of intelligence and experience, that enables the vigorous, mature mind to arrive at a more reasonable and workable solution to a problem than the vigorous, youthful mind. The older man who has not developed judgment cannot hope to best young men in the field of intellectual activity. Webster's definition of judgment as "the power of arriving at a wise decision or conclusion on the basis of indications and probabilities when the facts are not clearly ascertained;—the operation of the mind, involving comparison and discrimination, by which knowledge of values and relations is mentally formulated," might well be placed in service manuals as one of the basic requisites for officers holding command or staff positions of responsibility.

Conclusive proof that age alone bears no relation to the mental powers of individuals is offered in the following excerpt from *The Second Forty Years*; Professor Harvey Lehman, psychologist at Ohio University, has for some years been analyzing the relation of age to ability in creative thinking as revealed by accomplish-

ments in scientific research and productivity in original work in the graphic, musical, and literary arts. His vast collection of data shows that there exists so great a variation of the age at which different individuals produced their greatest contributions that no general correlation with age is justified. There is, however, a qualitative difference in the original work produced in relative youth and/or in later years. Young men tend to write numerically more scientific papers than older scientists and their reports are concerned largely with demonstration of newly found facts and minutiae. Scientific publications dealing with basic principles and the correlation of many facts to formulate new working hypothesis are more frequently the work of older scientists." Note the role that judgment plays! For every Stuart there must be a Lee, for every John Paul Jones a Mahan, for every youthful aviator wearing stars a Vandegrift, Nimitz, or Marshall.

It seems evident that any profession that is not to remain static requires both the eager intelligence of young men and the sagacious intelligence of older men. It is especially imperative that the armed services should not sacrifice their senior officers in a blind rush to place young

officers in high position. Rather should they strive by every means possible to insure that senior officers, now and in the future, possess the vital qualities of intelligence and judgment that will enable them to be *thinking* leaders of their profession.* It is now evident that more grave and far reaching decisions must be made by the armed forces during this postwar era than in any comparable period in our nation's history. It is also evident that we cannot again expect a period of grace after a declaration of war in which to seek competent leaders. Those officers in responsible positions in time of peace must be fully capable of fulfilling such positions increased requirements in time of war.

There are two fundamental reasons why the man who grows old in the services finds it more difficult to maintain a receptive, clear, and unprejudiced mind than does his civilian running mate. These are (a) the nature of his profession; and (b) the nature of his professional and social environment. Both of these combine to make it relatively easy for the average officer to develop unknowingly a closed and rigid mind.

☛ IN TIME OF PEACE, the profession of arms offers only very limited opportunities for the exercise or development of the mind. Among the principles of good military organization are: detailed regulation and supervision, uniformity, discipline, and strict obedience of orders—all qualities antithetical to the development of a mind capable of creative thinking, sound judgment, and wise decision. The vast majority of officer billets are of a routine supervisory nature, concerned with enforcing and supervising the execution of existing orders, customs, and regulations. This tremendous body of rules prescribes in the most minute detail every conceivable aspect of military life, operations, and administration—what, when, and how clothes are worn; what and when to eat; when to sleep and when to rise; how to fire a gun, sail a ship, fly a plane, and all related operations; how to write or file a letter; how to comply with orders, rules, and regulations; and how to receive, store, issue, use, maintain, and dispose of the innumerable items used in the armed forces.

If such multitudinous and all-encompassing rules are necessary for the efficient operation of the services it must never be forgotten that they

*It is accepted that in time of war "senior" officer does not necessarily mean "older" officer. In a relatively brief time the young officer may gain that military experience, which, combined with intelligence, gives him the quality of judgment necessary for positions of great responsibility.

... peacetime service encourages small minds



Age and Victory

<i>Name</i>	<i>Victory and Date</i>	<i>Age</i>
Alexander the Great	Gaugamela (331 B.C.)	25
Caesar	Rubicon (57 B.C.)	45
Charlemagne	Saxony (782)	40
Gustavus Adolphus	Walhof (1626)	32
Marlborough	Blenheim (1706)	56
Frederick the Great	Seven Years' War (1756-63)	44
Washington	Yorktown (1781)	49
Wellington	Waterloo (1811)	46
Napoleon	Austerlitz (1805)	36
Lee	Chancellorsville (1863)	57
Grant	Vicksburg (1863)	41
Pershing	Argonne (1918)	58
MacArthur	Philippines (1944)	64
Halsey	Solomon Islands (1943)	62
Vandegrift	Guadalcanal (1942)	55

also act to stifle original thinking in the services. The endless exhortations (also by order) to develop initiative among all ranks bear mute testimony to this condition. Rare indeed is the event or circumstance that is outside the scope of precedence or existing rules, and requires an officer to do some intensive, logical, and original thinking to arrive at the proper decision. Such an event is so unusual that it is immediately recognized as such and promptly forwarded to a higher authority for decision. The ease with which original thinking may be avoided in the services, and success still be assured, is recognized in the military maxim, "Don't take your finger off your number."

The absence of active, combative, competition within the services eliminates one of the most potent stimulants of original, enterprising thought to which the individual is subjected. Cooperation and compliance are the keystones of military methods of accomplishment, and open professional competition amongst its members is frowned upon. Compared to his civilian counterpart, who must triumph in a fiercely competitive world to succeed, the service officer may be likened to the runner who races against the

stop watch instead of a field of runners, or the boxer who trains only by punching the bag and never spars.

THE SERVICES, wittingly or not, effectively segregate and isolate most of their officers from frequent contact with successful people in civilian life. Except for a relatively few billets where the service and civilian worlds tangentially touch, an officer deals only with other service men in the performance of his duties. He does not have the constant and broadening experience of working with, or against, men of other occupations, education, and background as does his civilian professional counterpart. His social life is equally quarantined in that it is confined almost exclusively to friends and acquaintances within the services, and mostly in his own service at that. In the civilian's clubs and residential districts there is an intimate and cosmopolitan mixture of many occupations; in the serviceman's stations and clubs there is only one. Thus, even when the serviceman is not working, his associations are largely confined to those same persons with whom he is in constant professional association. Such a segregated social community,



... strong backs don't insure good judgment

existing in the penumbra of its supporting institution, tends to produce restricted social and intellectual horizons in its members. The sterility their social intercourse often develops was aptly described by Samuel Johnson as, "The penury of insular conversation."

This unfortunate aspect of the professional and social environment of the service officer acts in conjunction with the nature of his profession to handicap the retention, or development, of an active and creative mind by limiting his personal contact with stimulating ideas from other fields of human endeavor. He is thus deprived of many of the influences that help most to keep his mind from becoming narrow, flabby, and mediocre. The exhilarating mental exercise experienced in the adventure of acquiring original knowledge on some subject new to him, or of allowing his mind to roam freely and inquiringly in refreshing thought in fields not directly connected with his regular duties, are not offered to him as frequently as to the civilian.

What can be done to preserve and stimulate the growth of the aging individual's intellectual

powers, especially in the services where the conditions affecting the mind's deterioration are aggravated? The mental hazards encountered in growing older are common knowledge, and it would seem that every intelligent man would take the necessary means himself to insure that his mind remained vigorous and open as he ages. His firmest resolves to do so are usually defeated, however, by the universal human frailty for zealously shirking mental work. It is much easier and more entertaining to play golf, go to the movie, read a magazine, or just sit and talk shop outside of working hours than to strain the mind over some difficult and challenging problem. It thus seems necessary for the services to require and assist him to retain a thinking mind throughout his service career.

An intelligent, broad-minded corps of officers is one of the greatest bulwarks of our national defense. The effort, time, and funds to produce such an officer corps are of equal importance with that we are now so enthusiastically lavishing on the development of new weapons and equipment. For of what benefit are the most advanced and modern weapons if they are in the hands of archaic, hide-bound military thinkers?

THE FIRST and most important corrective measure for the services to take is to provide means to insure continuity of learning. For learning, which is the process of acquiring new knowledge by study and thought, is the foremost means of mental exercise and conditioning. The extreme difficulty older persons encounter in achieving concentrated thought on a particularly difficult problem is nothing more than a lack of practice in thinking. Dr Stieglitz states, "The element of continuing practice in learning is extremely important. In the discussion of adult education we mentioned the detrimental effect of abruptly stopping the habit of study upon graduation from school or college." Every officer from the day he enters the service to the day he leaves the service should be required to continue and extend the acquisition of knowledge that he began in his formal education.

In this way the services may be assured that the officer's mind is protected from the same flabbiness and atrophy over which they are so concerned in his muscles. Countless orders have been issued by all military echelons prompting or ordering officers to take regular physical exercise to maintain a healthy body. But has an order ever been issued requiring all officers

to take regular mental exercise to maintain a healthy mind? Observance of our oft quoted ideal of "a healthy mind in a healthy body" requires mental as well as physical exercise. Among the extensive group of senior officers upon whose decisions the nation's security rests in peace and war, a wise, penetrating, clear-thinking mind borne on a body that looks and acts its age is much to be preferred to the shallow, narrow, unthinking mind atop the body of a Samson.

The means to carry out a continuity of learning program for officers already exists in the services' excellent educational correspondence institutes. All that is necessary to initiate such a program is a requirement that *every* officer complete a specified number of credit hours *each* year of his service. It is desirable that the courses taken by an officer either complement or supplement his formal education obtained either in school or college (or by previously taken correspondence courses), and that there be no "snap courses." The officer with only a high school or partial college education would embark upon a course of study designed to give him the equivalent of a college education. The college or service academy graduate would enroll in courses that would carry his college studies into more advanced levels, complete his studies in other fields of knowledge not intensively covered in securing his particular degree, or take him into completely new fields of study.

The amount of work required to be completed each year should not be so great as to make the program burdensome and unpopular. Neither should it be so light that it does not serve its intended purpose. Once the learning habit became firmly fixed in the individual, a moderate amount of required work would not take a very large part of his time. The results obtained by both the individual and the services, in return for this small effort on his part, might well be beyond calculation in terms of lives, money and the national well being.

A second corrective measure required is to devise some means whereby officers are removed from service associations and environment for at least one period in their career. Something in the nature of a military sabbatical year would prove very effective as a form of "shock therapy" to prevent the monotonous routine of service professional and social life from becoming the fatal rut it does for so many officers. This period should come somewhere between age 35 and 40 to be of greatest benefit.

During this period officers would pursue any of several approved activities that have a readily apparent practical value. They might travel or reside in specified foreign countries, studying the language, geography, and all phases of the national life. They might continue their program of correspondence studies in a college or university to obtain a bachelor's or higher degree. They might enter or study industrial, scientific, or business institutions to translate desirable methods or procedures found there to the services, or to gain additional knowledge on the officer's service specialty. When officers returned to service duty from their sabbatical year, they would come back refreshed, filled with new knowledge and ideas, and eager to resume again the duties of their chosen profession.

A service whose officers possess experience and qualifications similar to the above in addition to their professional attainments is vastly better prepared for war than if they do not. No matter how remote the locale where it had to fight it could find a goodly number of its officers who were thoroughly familiar with the area and knew the language. Names like Guadalcanal, Kiska, Rangoon, and Reykjavik appearing in operation orders would not send staffs scurrying for encyclopedias, gazetteers, and old copies of the NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC. There would be ample officers immediately familiar with the tremendous problems of procurement and industrial mobilization. All would possess a greater fund of knowledge and have a more flexible, open, mind than if they had spent their sabbatical year doing over again the things they had done so often before.

✻ EVERY WAR of our national history has found us handicapped at its outset by the same two obstacles which have combined to make our major wars both prolonged and costly. The first of these has been the pitifully inadequate size and obsolete equipment of our armed forces. The second has been the excessive number of senior officers whom the preceding years of peace had made unfit, rather than fit, for war. The services now, as often before, are endeavoring to persuade the nation not to commit the first named folly once more by allowing the armed forces to dwindle and languish again. Let the services do their part and eliminate forever the second threat to our national security. It is within their own power to do so. US ✻ MC

The Thin Line Of Tradition



✿ DESPITE GENERAL ASSENT TO THE PROPOSITION that preservation of tradition is crucial to the Corps, it cannot be denied as of 1947 that the Marine Corps has broken with many characteristic traditions, and still others have been permitted to lapse. Let us examine, therefore, the effects and extent of this trend within a few areas of Marine life where tradition has been of particular importance.

By LtCol John Corbin

Language and Terminology

"In the more than a month that the Marine Brigade fought in and around the Bois de Belleau, I got a good opportunity to get the address psychology. . . . The habitual Marine address was 'Lad'. . . . No Marine was ever too old to be a 'Lad'. The marines never start anywhere; they always 'shove off'. There were no kitchens; the cooking was done in 'galleys'. No one ever unfurled a flag—he 'broke it out'."

—LtGen James G. Harbord, USA.

✿ DESPITE ITS IMPORTANCE as a vehicle for the creation of atmosphere and even of habits of thought, the characteristic vocabulary of marines seems to be waning daily. Well-established, "salty" terms and phrases are being dropped in favor of non-traditional weaker terms. Where Army expressions exist—probably due to continued repetition in movies, press and radio—these often crowd out Marine Corps equivalents of equal suitability and superior traditional value. Civilian-isms seem to carry over in greater quantity and with more sticking-power than in the past. Since one wellspring of Marine lingo is the language of the sea, or, to be more specific, that of the Navy, weakening of Marine speech can be closely correlated with an even greater current collapse in the Navy's distinctive vocabulary. While this trend may be arrested as the Corps resumes its ultra-professional character, every marine of experience should watch his language; it is a valuable heritage.

Old Corps language and traditions are rapidly passing from the everyday use of the men in the new Marine Corps. Once-colorful uniforms, courtesies, and customs have been changed; civilian and Army terms have crept into salty Corps language

Here are some examples of watered-down Marine talk:

Aye, aye, sir, prescribed and traditional response to an order, is heard with diminishing frequency. Most officers, especially those of relatively short service, will permit a subordinate to get away with *Very well, sir*; *All right, sir*; or just plain *Yes, sir*.

The recent general changeover in titles of non-commissioned rank (essentially a victory of the IBM machine over the individual) dealt a heavy blow to the color and quality of Marine Corps speech. A Corps without gunnery sergeants and field musics will seem pallid indeed. In line with the same trend, the conversion of marine gunners to mere warrant officers seemed in many, if not most instances, a positive demotion, and one not only of language, but involving as well the abolition of a distinctive device of rank, the gunner's bursting bombshell, in favor of a denatured sort of lieutenant's insignia.

One of the most commented-upon fauna of the Marine vocabulary was the field-scarf, or, as it was often shortened, the scarf. To Navy and Army, it was a necktie, but within the Corps it was, by God, a scarf. Until recently, that is. Changed uniform regulations, however, not only sounded the deathknell of a certain cotton thing worn about the neck, but, far worse, redesignated it as a *tie*.

Another departure in the terminology of clothing has been the descriptive designation of the new service jacket by type of material rather than color or weight. Thus we have the "Jacket, service, *wool*," intruding into the familiar color-code of *blues*, *greens*, *whites*, and *khakis*. It is an Army locution, of course, and this usage of *wool*, *cotton*, *denim*, *herringbone twill*, etc., would sound familiar and proper within the domains of the Pentagon.

The Army, or, more exactly, Army schooling, gained another beachhead in Marine terminology when Letter of Instruction No. 1236 finally officialized the "S" and "G" as staff-section designations vice the traditional and considerably more descriptive native Marine *Bn-*, *R-*, *D-*, *C-*, and *F-*. There are those who contend that this change was as inevitable as our abandonment,



during the Twenties, of numerical company designations, but I have often been asked by Army friends just why the Corps dropped what seemed even to their outside eyes an accurate and unmistakable system.

Miscellaneous Army terms have also made headway at the expense of home-grown originals. Ones that come to mind are *latrine* for *head*; *Special Services*; *reenlist* for *ship over*; *hitch* instead of, *cruise*; *GI* as a noun which includes enlisted marines; and *Marine Air Corps*.

Uniforms and Clothing

✦ MARINE CORPS UNIFORMS, especially in the dress category, constitute one of our greatest single resources¹. If there is one outward and visible attribute of the marine, it is his distinctive traditional and inherently handsome uniforms. Despite this axiomatic truth, the Marine tradition of dress uniforms appears now to be fighting for life. Blues, to be sure, are slowly reappearing on both officer and enlisted levels, and some officers (possibly due to civilian clothing shortages) wear blues for social functions of the black or white tie sort; but we have yet to see units restored to blues, and, until we do, blues cannot be regarded as saved for Marine Corps posterity. Far more in the balance, however, is the gorgeous, quite unique officers' evening dress, which embodies almost undisturbed, more long-standing traditional components, perhaps, than any other uniform in the Corps repertoire. Due to complexities of tailoring—not to speak of the mindset which prescribes such a fine uniform and then virtually proscribes its wearing—it is understood that even now consideration is being given to the abolition or radical redesign of evening dress. It might be better instead to spare the uniform as is and encourage its customary use.

Several departures from established traditions of the uniform are listed below:

The tendency to make a dress item out of the standard bronze button seems to be crowding this distinctive and traditional device off all service uniforms in favor of horn or plastic buttons which are just buttons. Two possible defenses of the trend can be imagined: (a) simplicity of procurement; and (b) the supposition that a horn button is somehow more suitable for

working, service, or combat clothes than one which is stamped with a Marine Corps device. Unless the first of these arguments is of a peculiarly overriding nature, it holds little water. As for the second consideration, we would do well to remember that the bronze button was adopted and retained not because bronze looks well with greens and khaki, but because it has minimum visibility under field conditions². Nevertheless, we find that the exposed cuff-buttons on the new service-jackets are of faceless horn or plastic rather than an equally functional and certainly more traditional engraved bronze.

The chevron-cut cuff which used to adorn every Marine Corps blouse or overcoat seems to be on the wane, for it is conspicuously omitted from the specifications both of the short overcoat and the service jacket.

Widespread wearing of unit patches contravenes the old Marine tradition of the Corps as a single, indivisible entity. Patches emphasize unit spirit at the expense of Corps spirit, tacit acquiescence in an Army concept that you cannot make men loyal to anything much bigger than an individual unit. Nevertheless, on grounds of tradition and principle alone, a few marines, both officer and enlisted, prefer to be distinguished only by their Marine Corps emblems.

✦ THE PASSING of the khaki field scarf will probably be unwept, especially by those who knew it only in its sad pointed-end days. Nevertheless, it might have been instructive for those who design uniforms to note how sought-after the old square-cut scarves remained, especially among enlisted personnel, many of whom went to the illegal extent of having the newer pointed scarves recut to specifications of the older type. A tradition of such vitality might deserve rehearing and reprieve.

Of course the field hat is long gone, but in tradition and in undismissible functionalism, it ought not to be lightly forgotten. As a tradition, the hat came down from the winning of the West, where it was the cherished headgear of some of the finest field soldiers in our military history, the Indian-fighting, old Regular Army. To them, as to many generations of marines, the field hat provided shade in summer; protection alike from glare, wind, and rain for the rifleman;

¹See *Let's Use Our Dress Uniforms*, by LtCol R. D. Heintz, Jr., MARINE CORPS GAZETTE, November, 1946.

²The Royal Marines, on green utility clothing not dissimilar to our own, use dark metal or plastic buttons stamped with the Corps badge.

warmth in winter; and practically every other functional and traditional attribute of soldierly headgear except the ability to hold its shape in a seabag—which is probably the reason it is no longer with us.

Courtesies and Customs

☛ WAR IS NO RESPECTER either of courtesy or custom, and it is in this field, as in the related one of etiquette, that the greatest aggregate departures from longstanding Marine Corps tradition can be observed. A few are mentioned:

The Corps has, in general, lost much of its tang of the sea. This is logical and explainable by reason of the fact that in a hundred-thousand outfit, only a small percentage of officers and men have served afloat, whereas ten years ago, the marine who had not put in his cruise at sea could not be considered professionally well-rounded. Secondary effects of this general condition can be found in changing speech and slang; failure to keep time by the ship's bell which used to sound on virtually every Marine post, and even in some camps; and in loss of the traditional polished immaculacy which distinguished Marine graduates of service afloat.

Noncommissioned officers, by and large, fail to maintain their distinct and separate status, especially as regards the once ironclad Brahminism of the first three paygrades. Despite the most deep-seated contrary traditions, it is not unusual to see NCOs on liberty and recreation with non-rated men, and, in some commands, few if any steps are taken to encourage the proper official and social aloofness which was once the hallmark of staff noncommissioned officers.

Time was when the Marine Corps tradition of saluting was as fixed as the laws of the Medes and Persians, when, in fact, marines of all units and ranks saluted proudly, smartly, and automatically. This is no longer the case, either ashore or in barracks, and it constitutes a painful embarrassment for the memory of the old Corps when one encounters the oblivious 300-yard stare with which most new marines—including many junior officers—evade what should be their proud and soldierly privilege.

Allied to the wholesale lapse in saluting is the apparent demise of the traditional overtaking courtesy of "By your leave, sir."³ It is, in fact, doubtful whether most marines of the present

generation would even know what this means, although it was a tradition of standing and venerability.

Perhaps a necessary casualty to new times is the tradition of the individual's own weapon. Until five years ago, every marine at boot camp was issued his own rifle, the weapon which was to stay with him for better or for worse throughout his career in the Corps, to become, in due course, almost a member of his body and a projection of his personality. Individually inconvenient and logistically difficult as this system was, it dramatized throughout the Corps the traditional concept that every marine was primarily a rifleman and that, regardless of eventual specialization far from ground combat, he must always remain psychologically and professionally prepared to fight as an infantryman.

What all this proves, if anything, might be hard to sum up in a sentence—except that new times bring new ways. Yet certain it is, as we have just seen, that at least sixteen traditional aspects of even quite recent life in the Marine Corps have or soon will be changed, not as part of any plan or program, and more probably in the absence of any such.

The fact is, although tradition, collectively speaking, constitutes the lifeblood and stock-in-trade of the Marine Corps, individual traditions wax and wane, "jest grow" and decline more or less by personal whim of those who happen to be making policy at any given time. At least it is true that they die in this way, and, however much regretted, a murdered tradition is about as hard to revive as any other sort of corpse.

☛ THE MORAL for policy-makers, therefore, might be: before you deliver a Marine Corps tradition to the axe—*stop, look, and listen.*

Ask:

Does the change materially affect salutary traditions of the Corps?

If so, will the loss to tradition be fully balanced by whatever tangible gain is foreseen?

Will the change tend to make the Marine Corps that much more into just another military unit, or will it preserve and emphasize our distinctive characteristics?

Remember:

Napoleon's relative evaluation of morale vs. materiel.

The highest and the only untouchable tradition of the Marine Corps is quality. US MC

³The custom whereby any junior overtaking a senior would, upon passing, salute and say, "By your leave, Sir."

In Brief

Headquarters, Marine Corps has announced that *former noncommissioned officers* who are qualified will be eligible for commissions in the Marine Corps Reserve. This will apply to former NCOs of the Regular Corps as well as the Reserve.

Distribution of 7,000,000 *Victory Medals* is expected to get underway this summer. Veterans will be required to report in person for their medals, produce evidence that they are qualified to receive them, and sign a receipt. American Defense, American Theater, European-African-Middle East, Asiatic-Pacific, and Occupation Medals will be distributed at a later date.

Airliners of the future will be noiseless and vibrationless, according to tests made recently in Britain with a jet-propelled passenger plane which uses a combination of turbine engines and conventional piston engines. Once the plane is airborne, the piston engines can be switched off to eliminate noise and vibration.

The Navy will begin "canning" more than 2000 surplus carrier and trainer aircraft this month. The process involves sealing the planes, with wings folded, in metal containers constructed of panels of corrugated steel. This process has been found more practicable than the previous method of sealing planes within "cocoons" of sprayed plastic.

All persons who were *prisoners of war* are entitled to waivers of premiums, for period of confinement, on their government insurance. Claims should be forwarded to Headquarters, Marine Corps, through channels. All claims must be filed before 1 August 1947.

First pay graders who served in a commissioned or warrant status may now have their date of rank in the first pay grade postdated to the date of commissioning. One stipulation, however, provides that service since commissioning must have been continuous active duty.


During the past war the Japanese developed a *giant electric mortar*. The barrel was constructed of wood and steel, and was fitted with electric coils. Inside the barrel was a metal casing which was impelled by a current from the breech to the muzzle, causing high muzzle velocity. Although the mortar had no initial sound, flash, or smoke, tremendous amounts of electricity were required.

United States citizenship for the *natives of Guam and American Samoa* has been recommended by a special civilian committee appointed by the Navy Department to study the situation. It is believed by this committee that the natives of both islands are entitled to rights as American citizens in recognition of the services they rendered to the United States during the war.

An *experimental rocket range*, expected to cost \$20,000,000, is to be constructed in South Australia. Rockets will be fired in a northwesterly direction and will ultimately cross the Western Australia coast between Shellborough and Broome in the direction of Christmas Island, 3000 miles away in the Indian Ocean.

The XHRP-1, *latest in helicopters*, is capable of transporting ten persons or heavy cargo up to a ton. Powered by a 600 hp Pratt and Whitney engine, the helicopter can take off vertically with heavy loads, reach speeds better than 100 mph, and climb to high altitudes. The model is now being produced in quantity for use by the Marine Corps, Navy, and Coast Guard.

The ABCs of Guided Missiles



Part II

MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS

STUDENTS OF MILITARY HISTORY HAVE DEDUCED certain principles which have proven themselves to be basic to the military art. In 1921 the War Department published them in Training Regulations for the guidance of commanders of all echelons.

Every marine, of course, is familiar with them; they are nine in number:

1. The Principle of the Objective
2. The Principle of the Offensive
3. The Principle of Mass
4. The Principle of Economy of Force
5. The Principle of Movement
6. The Principle of Surprise
7. The Principle of Security
8. The Principle of Simplicity
9. The Principle of Cooperation

The advent of new weapons has not changed the validity of these fundamental principles, but the method of employing them has quite definitely been influenced. Strategy is in reality the application of these principles in planning for and directing a war; tactics is their application to battle.

At this stage of the guided missile art, strategy is the more important of the two.

The entire national policy and the individual policies of the two services are now applying the first principle, the principle of the objective. One of the most important decisions to be made is that of the military requirements of the various types of missiles that we are going to develop. This depends on considerations which are too

numerous to list in this article, but certain broad generalities may be mentioned.

In the first place, the types of targets to be encountered must be considered. They may be in the air, on land, on sea, or under the sea.

Of these the two most important are the aerial and subsurface. They are the most important

because they are the hardest to detect and they are the most difficult to hit.

Aerial targets may well be missiles carrying atomic warheads and approaching from extreme range at supersonic velocity with little or no warning. Submarines may at some time in the future be powered by atomic energy and capable of approaching to close range and launching missiles from either surfaced or subsurfaced positions. These weapons then would necessitate the development of defensive weapons capable of interception; the one in the air against a small, fast, and maneuverable target, the other against an underwater vessel.

For any weapon the main factors to be considered are its range, hit expectancy or accuracy, destructiveness, and rate of fire. Against attacking missiles of the type described in the preceding paragraph all four are highly important. If one of them is underdeveloped some one of the others must be more highly developed. As an example let us suppose that our antimissile missile has a low rate of fire. If such is the case, then the hit expectancy and destructiveness must be great enough to ensure total destruction

By LtCol Keith McCutcheon

The surprise element of guided missiles will be *sine qua non* of future warfare

of the incoming target. On the other hand, if the rate of fire is high we may be able to sacrifice some on the hit expectancy. In the determination of our military requirements we must correlate the characteristics so that a high overall efficiency of the missile is obtained. And if this overall efficiency is not developed to a greater value than comparable conventional weapons, guided missiles may not be satisfactory for military or naval operation.

Range is largely going to be determined by the skillful combination of aerodynamics and propulsion; hit expectancy by guidance; destructiveness by armament; and rate of fire by launching. This is true in only the most general of terms; the design of the missile and all components will affect each and every military characteristic.

Target characteristics, as was stated above, will determine the military requirements for our weapons; these military requirements in turn will then regulate the characteristics of the missile components in order to design a weapon to solve the military problem in an attractive manner.


Although the emphasis in the previous discussion was on defense which is in keeping with our national policy of being a non-aggressor, it is the second principle of war, that of the offen-

sive, which must be followed if we are forced into global conflict. The old adage which states that the best defense is a strong offense is applicable in war as well as on the playing field. This is true, however, only when the means are at hand and available to ensure a reasonable chance for success. It must be part of our overall program then to develop offensive weapons as well as defensive ones. German development was parallel to this. Their primary interest as pointed out in Part I of this article was on long range bombardment as well as anti-aircraft defense. It is interesting to note in this connection that emphasis was placed on the former in spite of the fact that allied air superiority demanded substantial improvement in German anti-aircraft defense. They gambled on a potent offensive weapon to reduce allied air operations at the source; fortunately for us they lost.

Missiles may not be used in the same numbers or mass as conventional aircraft at the same time, but with improved warheads the destructive effort achieved can be the same or greater with less expenditure of mass.

The use of the atom bomb in the closing month of the recent war has opened the eyes of everyone to the tremendous possibilities and probabilities of the next war. Combined with the guided missile it would indeed present a

Figure 7. The Lark, a cruciform type of structure, has the four control surfaces of the wings placed at right angles to each other at the circumference of the vehicle.






Figure 8. Controlled by radar homing device, the Bat is an air-to-ship missile. Gravity powered, it is essentially a 1000-pound GP bomb launched from a bomb rack.

formidable weapon, but we must not be led into believing that all missiles will carry atomic warheads. National economy for one thing will prohibit it; the principle of the economy of force will work against it. Aerial targets for example do not seem to warrant the expenditure of an atomic warhead; improved conventional warheads or some other type should be able to solve the problem. This is true even if the target itself has an atomic warhead. A conventional warhead in a missile with highly-developed guidance would be a more economical solution than a missile with an atomic warhead and very poor guidance. Here again, however, it is proper to point out how important the guidance problem is. It can neither be overemphasized nor underestimated.

This principle ties in very closely with the principle of mass. It is in effect the means of placing into operation the mass.

Economy is all important during the national development period. Great care must be exercised in the selection of the objective, and skillful employment of men, materiel, and time must be carried out in order to have available essential weapons, when, where, and if we need them.

☛ **SPEED AND RANGE** are probably two of the outstanding characteristics of guided missiles. They influence the principle of movement. This principle in combination with those of mass and economy of force combine to form a product indicative of the extent of the application of the principle of the offensive. It may be likened

to the principle of momentum in mechanics. Mass times velocity (movement) times an efficiency factor (economy of force) equals the most efficient momentum (offensive).

Warfare has already seen how guided missiles affect the principle of surprise. The supersonic V-2 hit without warning. It cared not for darkness nor for bad weather. Comparable missiles will be capable of both round-the-clock and round-the-month operation.

☛ **CLOSELY INTEGRATED** with surprise is security. In many respects the one is the counterpart or opposite of the other. Reference can be made again to German operations in the recent war. In spite of all the security measures they tried to place in force the Allies were able through photo-interpretation to locate the launching sites of the V-1s and V-2s and to effectively reduce them by aerial bombing. On the other side of the picture, as was stated previously, the British found it necessary to marshal considerable effort to attain a satisfactory degree of security against the attacks of these missiles.

Guided missiles in themselves are not simple; in operation there is no reason why they should not simplify certain phases of the art of war. This principle is entirely a question of relativity but it will not be jeopardized or made obsolete by the advent of this new method of warfare.

Neither will the ninth and last principle, co-operation. If anything, the introduction of these new weapons will call for a higher and more

integrated form of cooperation than ever before experienced in history. Already this is being felt in the development programs of the services. Extensive liaison, joint boards and committees, constant interchange and dissemination of information, mutual cognizance and combined projects are now operative and will continue to be so. The Bikini operation, although not directly applicable one hundred per cent, indicates the form this cooperation is taking.

With this as a background it is now possible to make some general statements regarding the tactical use of missiles in warfare. In addition to the Germans, whose activity was discussed briefly at the beginning of this article, both the Japanese and the United States participated in a very small scale measure. The Japanese *kamikaze* might actually be termed a guided missile with all the guidance and control performed by a human operator. They either did not have the time or the scientific knowledge at the moment to develop suitable electronic or other means of guidance so they substituted human pilots. In many respects a human being is better than mechanical or electrical mechanisms; humans alone can predict history, that is, estimate corrections and apply them; guidance equipment can only react to signals and apply the necessary response.

THE UNITED STATES had been experimenting with controlled drones for several years before the war and some were used in the Pacific but with little success when compared to existing conventional aircraft. The Bat, illustrated in Fig. 8, had much more success and scored hits on several enemy ships before the war terminated. This is an air-launched antiship weapon carry-

ing a 1000 pound GP bomb as a warhead. Further development has been made with this missile and at the present time some Navy squadrons are undergoing operational training with Bat equipment.


During the planning stage for the invasion of Japan, work was in progress for the employment of the JB-2, the Army Air Forces designation of the German V-1 which was being manufactured in this country following German specifications. The Navy has since taken the same weapon and with a few modifications adapted it as a test vehicle under the name of Loon. Fig. 9 is a photograph of this pilotless aircraft.

THE USE of such a missile from naval vessels brings up several points of difference between operation of weapons of this type from shipboard and from stationary installations ashore. The launching and guidance problems are both affected by the movement of the ship about its axis and its translation through space. In addition the logistical problems are much more serious. Space requirements not only influence the design of missiles, components, and accessory apparatus, but they dictate the number of units of fire that can be transported in any one ship.

A rapid calculation of the number of ship tons required to transport a sufficient quantity of missiles the size of the V-1 or V-2 to carry on a prolonged and sustained bombardment for several weeks indicates that considerable lift is necessary.

It must be remembered, however, that ships of the future will be designed especially for this type of warfare. Fig. 10 shows a specially rigged rocket craft during the latter part of the

Figure 9. A surface-to-surface missile, the Loon is powered by a pulse jet. Using either preset or limited command guidance, it is launched from a catapult.



Pacific war; perhaps future guided missile ships will resemble this array with a few more radars thrown in for guiding the rockets to the target.

A future amphibious operation will make great use of these new developments. The preliminary bombardment can be made from ships or aircraft several hundred miles off shore. Submarines may approach to closer range and bombard. There will be no more lulls when weather grounds aircraft; if anything, bad weather may assist.

D-day may not vary too much from past D-days; naval gunfire will still be there, with missiles; the aircraft will be overhead, but they may all be pilotless, or at least armed with guided missiles; the landing craft transporting the troops to the beach may be jet propelled; close air support will be there although the form will be different from that seen in the last war; CICs and command posts will have new gadgets in them to keep the commanders more up-to-date on the situation; and the infantry will still be necessary to take the ground.

The essentials of air defense will not change. An adequate system will still require warning services, AAA or antimissile missiles, aircraft, and control centers. A strong offensive (one of the principles of war) will offer the best preventive defense; active air defense will be more necessary than ever before and of a much higher caliber; and passive measures such as dispersion, decoys, and camouflage will be certainly helpful to lessen damage that will be inflicted by missiles slipping by the active air defense.




Figure 10. Baptized by marines at Kwajalein, rockets fired from landing craft proved very helpful in subsequent landings.

Of all the elements of air defense the one that will require the most improvement—even more than missiles themselves—is the warning system. It does not require much imagination or very high mathematics to calculate how far out the warning net must reach in order to detect missiles that may be approaching with speeds of 3,000 miles an hour. Every minute lost in readying active air defense measures will bring the missile 50 miles closer. There may never be such a thing as condition two; defense may have to remain 100 per cent active every minute of every hour of the day. If just one supersonic atomic bomb gets through a lot of damage will be inflicted. You . . . may suffer!

US & MC

From: LtCol Robert D. Heinl, Jr., USMC.

To: The Marine Corps GAZETTE.

Subject:

Minority Report on (J)ASCO

✿ THAT BATTERED FOOTBALL, THE ASSAULT signal company, is being kicked around again.

Special interests want to dismember the ASCO, and—judging at least from the April GAZETTE, in which a magic, all-purpose firepower-coordination party was dished up to the public—better substitutes are at hand.

To be sure, it was hardly a surprise that the postwar Field Artillery conference, held at Fort Sill, brought in adverse recommendations regarding continued existence of joint assault signal companies; in light of the history of most Army JASCOS, such disposition of an apparently bastardized organization would seem only logical.

It is alarming, however, to see how far war-lessons and war-memories have faded since 1945; to see that already we have with us again that familiar peacetime phenomenon—the all-purpose, all-knowing, all-trained single officer (and a lieutenant at that) who knows the capabilities, characteristics, limitations and techniques of all arms, and possesses a multitrack brain with which to employ them. It was this officer, with his super-unified supporting arms control-party, who was recently proposed in the GAZETTE as a substitute for the poor old assault signal company.

Someone must have loved the JASCO, however, or the Joint Chiefs of Staff (no less) would never have directed its organization, nor would the Marine Corps, hardly amateur in amphibious operations, have steadfastly retained the ASCO, a streamlined version of the prototype, throughout the war and into the peace T/Os.

*The term (J)ASCO is used because, in the Army, the unit under discussion is designated "joint assault signal company" (JASCO that is), whereas the corresponding Marine formation is simply called "assault signal company" (ASCO). (J)ASCO represents the author's compromise.

This article was prepared before the reorganization of the FMF eliminated the ASCO as such. The assault signal company has been eliminated by including the naval gunfire liaison teams on the special staff of division headquarters and by integrating the assault signal teams into the communications platoons of the infantry and shore party battalions.

For those—and they are many—who are a bit hazy as to just what a (J)ASCO is, let me recapitulate. The (J)ASCO, meaning (joint) assault signal company, is a unit employed only in amphibious operations, which provides a single administrative and housekeeping roof for the naval gunfire teams, air liaison parties, and shore party communication teams required by a division during an assault landing. During and just prior to operations, all these terms are parcelled out by attachment to the respective rifle regiments and battalions of the division, so that in combat the (J)ASCO *per se* can hardly be said to operate at all except insofar as it regulates the flow of replacements, tabulates the casualties, and provides minor logistic backing for its dispersed elements.

✿ AT FIRST GLANCE, the three major sections of the (J)ASCO, namely, the Shore Fire Control Section, the Air Liaison Section and the Shore Party Communication Section, seem to be rather strange bedfellows, and, as we have seen, in battle go their separate ways. They have more in common, however, than first appears. Each is concerned to a great extent with communications; each must operate early in the assault; and the mission of each is to bridge the gap between landing force (troop) elements and various types of support furnished by external, usually naval agencies, whether these be fire-support ships, close-support aircraft or the transport divisions and squadrons which actually land the force. So far as is now known, there is no way to dispense with any of these types of support, so discussion about the (J)ASCO inevitably admits the functional necessity of the respective components, and the real nexus of controversy settles about organizational complaints:

a. The (J)ASCO is too large and unwieldy,

An amalgam of disputed command and dissenting "experts" during the war, the JASCO is no longer with us. Its replacement must include an over-all pattern of command relationships and communications adaptable to existing operational conditions

neither proper company nor battalion, yet with enough officers for a regiment.

b. The administrative headaches are something terrible, especially with those blank-blank Navy officers in the Shore Fire Control Section.

c. It "belongs" in entirety to nobody on the staff, and therefore tends to become a fatherless child even when securely attached to a division. But even then, it is still only an attachment (in the Army that is) and therefore preordained to the orphans' home.

d. When employed in repeated amphibious operations—by the now discarded practice (in the Marine Corps, that is) of detaching it from one and promptly re-attaching it to the next—it beats itself to pieces, and never learns to form part of any one team, thus providing satisfactory support and services to no one.

e. The fact that (J)ASCO properly "belongs" to no single staff officer or vested interest often makes it a storm center of staff struggles for power. The signal officer claims it for his own, while the air and naval gunfire officers* stoutly proclaim title to the Air Liaison and Shore Fire Control Sections. The artillery officer sometimes tries to take all because, after all, he coordinates supporting arms, and "coordination" can take in a lot of territory if it is defined aggressively by enough rank. Once in a while, even, the (J)ASCO commander tries to run the outfit, and then everybody jumps on him.

f. It is—in the Army particularly—not only an amalgam of services, but of branches within one service, so that a Signal Corps officer may be commanding a group of dashing field artillerymen, Air Corps bullyboys, engineers or whatnot.

☛ ALL OF THE FOREGOING criticisms of the (J)ASCO really add up to the simple sum that the organization is unconventional and that, when employed by units unfamiliar with its peculiar characteristics, it usually affords only partially successful results.

As a matter of fact, the comparative history

*On Marine staffs these are permanent special staff officers. In Army amphibious operations, they are sometimes provided and sometimes not.

of the development of Army and Marine JASCOs and of their final divergence when the Marine ASCO evolved, contains many lessons in the correct employment and usefulness of such units.

When originally formed, as we have said, by order of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in 1944, the joint assault signal companies, whether Marine or Army, were composed of a truly unwieldy mixture of troop and naval elements. A large part of the total strength, mainly in shore party communications, consisted of the so-called Naval Section. This was made up of Navy communication personnel—signalmen and radiomen—who were to be used for communication with ships. This section was an administrative sore thumb, and like any other group of sailors ashore, particularly the hastily-trained wartime variety, ill-prepared or indoctrinated for what would confront them on the beaches. It is small wonder that Army divisions, themselves understandably unfamiliar with service afloat or amphibious op-

LtCol Robert D. Heintz, Jr., entered the Marine Corps after graduating from Yale in 1937. His prewar service included sea duty and duty ashore in South America, Cuba, and with the FMF. The beginning of the war found him at Pearl Harbor with the 4th Defense Battalion. Later he was the Naval Gunfire Officer on the staffs of the 3d Marine Division, the V'Phib Corps, and FMF, Pac, respectively. He participated in the Iwo Jima operation (for which he has a Bronze Star) and the occupation of Japan. Now the head of the Historical Section HQMC, he has for years been a most frequent contributor to the GAZETTE. His last appearance in our printed columns was in June 1946 with "We're Headed for Wake" and November 1946 with "Let's Use Our Dress Uniforms."

erations, were equally at a loss in training or preparing these strange Naval Sections for duties ashore. The operational lesson gained quite speedily from early performance of the Naval Section was: don't use it. As a result, although the Naval Section survived in the T/O* for some time, it was in fact dispensed with piecemeal from JASCO to JASCO and operation to operation. The experience of Marine and Army JASCOs was rather similar in this respect, although Marine organizations, being themselves part of the Naval Service, were inherently much better fitted to absorb a Navy component.

Dispensing with the Naval Sections was the first long step in the evolution of the (J)ASCO. The next lesson to be learned related to their employment. As we have seen, it was originally envisaged that the JASCO should be at least corps, if not army or theater troops, to be attached and withdrawn for succeeding operations, and in large measure serving as the magic component which would create the amphibious character of a division (Army in this case). That was the theory at any rate. In practice, it soon appeared that the JASCOs required as much rest, recuperation, and regrouping as any other unit; that when hastily attached to a strange division, little opportunity arose for the teamwork which is indispensable in amphibious assault; and that, in effect, you could not get amphibious divisions cheap by adding or subtracting a JASCO.

At this point, regardless of their theoretical status, Fleet Marine Force Pacific took a major step toward gaining maximum usefulness from Marine JASCOs. This was simply the device of permanently attaching a single JASCO to each single Marine division. Since all Marine divisions are primarily amphibious assault divisions, there would be a constant need for joint assault signal company services, and, although the book still said that they were higher-echelon troops, Marine JASCOs, about the time of the Marianas campaign, at last found homes in the respective Marine divisions. Such a step could not be so readily taken by the Army, however, and Army's JASCOs remained detachable.

*The story of the JASCO tables of organization is a lesson in itself. Inasmuch as the JASCOs were formed by fiat of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, their T/O could be amended only on equally august levels. As a result, although many early defects of the JASCO were recognized by people on the ground, it represented a major administrative feat to convey the news to Washington levels where curative action could be taken. Thus the T/Os lagged so far behind public consciousness of the unit's defects that the JASCO's troubles came from long standing to be regarded as incurable. The liberation of the Marine ASCO from direct JCS control represented a major step in achieving the organizational flexibility that every new type of unit needs in order to develop.

☛ WHILE ALL these large lessons were being digested, many small ones became evident. These lay largely in the details of organization and in the composition of teams. For example, as the technique of naval gunfire support rose to its final high levels in the Pacific war,* one learned that battalion shore fire control parties were wretchedly understrength for their gruelling job, and that to secure really effective gunfire support, you must have well-trained regimental and divisional naval gunfire teams over and above those provided by the original JASCO T/Os for battalions only. Paralleling such lessons in the field of personnel, progress in techniques demanded new or different material. Since JASCO T/O and T/E were matters of high Washington concern, it was not easy to accommodate the organization to lessons from the field. All this was not generally perceived except within the Fleet Marine Force, which, with the Navy, had been the father of amphibious doctrine and thinking. At any rate, realizing the iron-bound problem of the T/Os, Fleet Marine Force Pacific, then commanded by LtGen Holland M. Smith, in October, 1944, undertook provisional modification of Marine JASCO T/Os to meet actual needs well in advance of action from Washington.** Failing such action, or for that matter, any agency which could take just that action in the Pacific, Army JASCOs continued perforce to operate with shortages which must be made good from battle to battle by spare-part augmentations at the expense of supported divisions so that the parent unit often ended up by supporting the JASCO rather than, as had been intended, vice versa.

☛ BY THE BEGINNING of 1945, using, say, the Iwo Jima operation as a milestone, there had developed in practice at least, a considerable divergence between the Marine and Army JASCO. The former had rolled with the punches and had, in spite of the peculiarly inflexible mold in which both units were initially cast, found its level and become fairly well integrated in the structure of the Marine division. The latter was still grappling with its T/O and T/E, not to speak of some doctrinal uncertainties as to how it should be employed. Both units, however, still bathed in the unwelcome notoriety which early difficulties had begotten, and it had become rather

*One hundred twenty-nine thousand tons—count 'em—of naval gunfire support were delivered in support of Marines alone during the great Pacific battles, largely from the Marianas on.

**FMFPac Special Order 86-44.

the fashion to disparage the (J) ASCO as a misfit, not for what it now was (especially in the Fleet Marine Force), but for what it had been two battles ago.

If confirmation were needed that Marine thinking on the (J) ASCO was substantially sound, V-J Day virtually brought it, for, in early September, 1945, sweeping changes were promulgated in the Army JASCO T/O, so that, as revised, the outfit looked very like a Marine ASCO. Alas (if that is the word), the new organization was destined never to be given combat trial, and, in the Army, the name, JASCO, remains under a cloud, a rather dark one.

Shaking up the tables of organization is a pleasant imaginative sport peculiar to soldiers; and naturally everyone has his own solution for the (J) ASCO. The field artilleryman doesn't care what happens to the rest of the organization, but he is certain that the naval gunfire teams should somehow become part of division artillery. The

leryman and aviator sometimes overlook is that a (J) ASCO has other missions than those which impinge upon artillery or close air support, whereas the signal officer forgets that in the majority of (J) ASCO operations, achievement of communication, Signal's ultimate, is merely the first step toward accomplishment of the (J) ASCO mission, which is to obtain and assist in employment of various types of support.

From the viewpoint of the supported units any such changes would be, up to a point, a matter of indifference (except perhaps if it came to inclusion of air, NGF and shore party communication teams within the supported battalions and regiments). All that really concerns the rifle units is that they get the best possible support when they need it. This boils down into four general troop-requirements which must be met, (J) ASCO or not. These are:

(1) That individual teams be suitably organized and adequately equipped.

"... Someone must have loved the JASCO, or the Chiefs of Staff would never have directed its organization, nor would the Marine Corps, hardly amateur in amphibious operations, have retained the ASCO throughout the war and into the peace T/Os..."

Air Forces, interested primarily in air-support functions of the (J) ASCO, would like to see the Air Liaison Section taken clean out of a ground force organization and allocated to units for close support missions only as and if approved through channels. Signal officers will give you a half-dozen suggestions, three most frequent of which are: (1) disband the (J) ASCO but make its component teams organic (within amphibious divisions, of course) to the respective units which they support in combat; (2) amalgamate the entire (J) ASCO into the division signal company; (3) create a division signal battalion which includes (J) ASCO elements either as separate platoons or as an intact company.

Among all these diverse proposals, there is but one common thread which winds from point to point: the idea of special interest in only one or another aspect of what the (J) ASCO does. To the artilleryman, the organization is interesting mainly as the resting-place for shore fire control personnel; to the aviator, it is a roost for air liaison parties; to Signal—which, in all fairness, usually preserves the broadest outlook—it constitutes a tempting reservoir of trained communication-personnel and equipment. What the artil-

(2) That the overall pattern of communications and command-relationships be adapted to actual needs and operational conditions.

(3) That teams be immediately available whenever required either for combined training or in combat.

(4) That all teams be properly trained.

✱ THE FOREGOING desiderata (except the second, which involves high policy) can be realized by the existing (J) ASCO. In organization and equipment, as we have seen, it now possesses T/O and T/E which reflect a wealth of combat experience. For training, the (J) ASCO is really an excellent vehicle, because most basic and technical assault signal training must be centralized on division or sometimes higher level; yet all of it is wasted if teams cannot be intimately associated with their own supported battalions and regiments during the larger portion of the training cycle. Availability is something else that the (J) ASCO provides; although its teams train separately, they are always at hand for supported-unit field-problems, CPX, and, of course, during the last critical weeks prior to an operation.

Considering the present estate of the (J) ASCO,

a number of statements may therefore be enunciated with some certainty:

a. The Marine ASCO, as organized and as employed, is, generally speaking, a satisfactory unit.

b. Regardless of how you dismember it, the functional tasks now allocated to (J)ASCO must continue to be performed.

c. The (J)ASCO actually provides a desirable neutral ground for often competing interests and elements, permitting great flexibility in assignment of its teams to rifle units when so needed, and yet allowing centralized operational control and training on the division level.

d. If the (J)ASCO's variegated composition begets administrative trouble, at least the difficulties remain at a head in one organization and are not spread thin, far and wide throughout the

division.

e. Like any other highly specialized unit, the (J)ASCO should be kept off paper, should be given continual training, and cannot be whipped up on short notice for a maneuver or an expedition.

f. In any proposal to abolish the (J)ASCO, look for the hook—many such suggestions arise from the desire of one special interest or another to extend its control of personnel, extra equipment, or firepower.

Taking the foregoing postulates into consideration with the history of the (J)ASCO's evolution, one is reminded of a wise old saying:

"There are some things in this life that need a good letting alone."

At present this includes the (J)ASCO.

US ♣ MC

Facts and Figures

♣ ONE OF THE FIGURES listed with each item is correct—but do you know which one?

1. During World War II U. S. submarines sank _____ of Japan's warships.

a. 1/20. b. 1/10. c. 1/3.

2. It is estimated that improved medical practice saved the lives of _____ Americans in World War II who suffered wounds which would have proved fatal in previous wars.

a. 5,000. b. 30,000. c. 120,000.

3. There were _____ American service men and women in Australia during some part of World War II.

a. 100,000. b. 1,000,000. c. 2,000,000.

4. Between December 1941 and December 1946 there were _____ members of the U. S. Navy who served overseas.

a. 543,879. b. 1,578,253. c. 3,628,488.

5. The total veteran population in this country now numbers _____.

a. 12,500,000. b. 18,375,000. c. 30,250,000.

6. What per cent of the U. S. Army personnel during World War II were officers?

a. 5%. b. 10%. c. 15%.

7. And what per cent of American soldiers killed on the battlefields during World War II were officers?

a. 2%. b. 7%. c. 13%.

8. During World War II the American Red Cross collected _____ blood donations for the armed forces.

a. 753,248. b. 2,382,322. c. 13,326,242.

9. Of the students now attending colleges and universities in this country, _____ per cent are former GIs.

a. 15. b. 30. c. 50.

10. A total of _____ former marines were elected to the last Congress.

a. 4. b. 12. c. 22.

Answers on page 69

Diaper Cruise Detachments—

✿ MOST MARINES ARE AWARE OF THE PART the Marine Corps plays in furnishing its quota of personnel serving aboard the Navy's fighting ships, but very few are familiar with the role played by Marine detachments serving aboard the vessels of the Naval Transportation Service; specifically, those that carry Navy and Marine dependents overseas, or more appropriately, the "Diaper Cruise" vessels.

These vessels are all in the auxiliary personnel class, of which there are approximately ten in commission, with others being recon-verted for such use. The strength of the average crew serving aboard one of these APs is about 350, of which 15 are marines. The present table of organization for the detachment allows one lieutenant, one first sergeant, two sergeants, four corporals, and eight privates or privates first class. It has been said that the duties of these small detachments are more numerous than the duties of a messman on the Marine Corps birthday, and after serving with them for over a year, I am inclined to agree.

Generally speaking, security of the ship, its passengers, and its cargo are the primary missions of the detachment. When troops are carried, a troop guard is supplied by the commanding officer of troops. This guard, its functioning, and its orders are the direct responsibility of the commanding officer of the Marine detachment. The detachment also takes care of four of the more important posts on the ship, and can be called on to supply an orderly for flag officer passengers.

Cargo is another security responsibility of the detachment. Large shipments of mail, post beverages, and household effects must be closely guarded, as pilfering is a constant problem. In the past eight months one particular NTS vessel has transported over \$19,000,000 in cash to various Naval activities overseas, whose security was solely dependent on the Marine detachment.

As aboard all Naval vessels, the detachment has been assigned a General Quarters ship's weapon to operate. A bridge-mounted, dual-

barrel 40mm gun is manned by the detachment, and a limited amount of emergency posts are also assigned to the marines.

Another collateral duty of the detachment is the manning of the ship's motor transport. Two vehicles are driven by marines, one of whom is the Captain's orderly and driver.

The efficiency that such a small detachment can maintain with proper schooling has brought about some very satisfactory results. For example, one detachment received a dispatch to the effect that a Naval prisoner had broken arrest,

and was believed to be smuggled or stowed away on board. A description was given which in-

cluded a tell-tale tattoo. The detachment immediately mingled with the 1200 sun bathing troops on board, and the prisoner was safely locked up in the ship's brig in less than two hours after receipt of the original dispatch. This can be fully appreciated when it is considered that the prisoner had escaped some twenty days before the shipboard arrest, and that about 4000 miles separated the scene of escape and the scene of arrest aboard ship.

Women and children constitute a very high percentage of the passengers plus a generous sprinkling of Civil Service personnel, Merchant Marine officers and seamen, civilian construction personnel, UNNRA officials, and families of Chinese, Russian, Filipino, Hawaiian, and other foreign extraction. So it can be readily seen that the Marine detachment is constantly in the public eye, and must therefore observe strict uniform regulations and maintain a smart military bearing at all times.

With a constant port of call list such as San Francisco, Honolulu, Guam, Samar, Manila, Subic Bay, Okinawa, Shanghai, Tsingtao, Taku Bar, Yokosuka, Yokohama, and Tokyo, duty with the Naval Transportation Service is considered choice sea duty by all of its Marine detachments. And it appears that the Naval Transportation Service considers the Marine detachments serving aboard their vessels choice men for the job.

US MC

By 1stLt Robert E. Hoskins

The 1947 Rifle Matches



☛ FOR THE SECOND TIME SINCE THE WAR (Marine Corps rifle and pistol competition was suspended in 1942, resumed last year) the best shooters in the Corps converged on Marine Barracks, Quantico, to try their luck.

The M1 rifle, now the basic infantry weapon, was used by rifle shooters. The scores were unusually high this year. This may have been due in part to changes made in the schedule of firing. Last year's course was modified by reducing the rapid fire on the 200- and 300-yard lines to 10 rounds instead of 16 rounds at each range, and adding 10 rounds to the slow fire from the prone position on the 600-yard line. Thus, with more shots to squeeze off over careful sights, the average score was generally higher.

☛ CAPT GUS C. DASKALAKIS of Air FMF, El Toro, took the Marine Corps Rifle Competition with a score of 567. This was 10 points better than last year's winner, TSgt Theodore F. Wade. In a disheartening 37th place on preliminary day, Capt Daskalakis took things more slowly and was in 14th place by the end of the first stage. When the last shot was squeezed off from the 600-yard line he was one point ahead of 1stLt George Kross. Capt Daskalakis was more or less a dark horse in the race, this being his first match in Marine Corps competition. By

winning the intra-base match at El Toro, then placing in the Western Division Rifle Matches, he came to Quantico with the Western Division team. He has fired before only for qualification and requalification, consistently achieving expert. The Captain was awarded a gold medal,

in addition to the McDougal Memorial Trophy. The trophy, a perpetual award to the

annual winner of the Marine Corps Rifle Match, is sponsored by the family and friends of the late LtCol David S. McDougal. Col McDougal was a record holder with the '03 rifle.

Capt Daskalakis was with the Fourth Marine Air Wing during the war.

Placing second in the match was 1stLt George Kross, of MCAS, El Toro. Kross and TSgt Maxin R. Beebe, winner of both rifle and pistol honors in the Western Division competitions, led the pack throughout the match. 1stLt Kross was awarded the Distinguished Marksman Medal, while TSgt Beebe won the 1st Gold Medal.

Tied for third and fourth place with scores of 564 were MSgt John A. Ward, Jr., of MCEB, Quantico, and MSgt Walter E. Fletcher, of San Diego. Ward was presented with a Distinguished Marksman Medal; Fletcher received the score only.

By PFC William A. McCluskey

Capt Gus C. Daskalakis takes Marine Corps Rifle Match; MSgt Walter E. Fletcher wins both Marine Corps Pistol Match and Lauchheimer Trophy. Balboa takes Elliot Trophy; Eastern and Western Divisions win Interdivision Pistol and Rifle Matches

Other winners were:

5. 1stLt Arthur A. Compton, MB, Philadelphia, 562 D/Mks.
6. Capt Thurman E. Barrier, MB, Parris Island, 562 D/Mks.
7. TSgt Maxin R. Beebe, USS *Iowa*, 562 1st Gold.
8. MSgt William L. Jordan, MCB, San Diego, 561 D/Mks.
9. WO Steve Disco, ServCom, 560 D/Mks.

✿ **WINNER OF BOTH** the pistol match and the coveted Lauchheimer Trophy was MSgt Walter E. Fletcher of MB, San Diego. Closely paced by WO Robert C. McIntyre who fired 548 to finish second, MSgt Fletcher shot 550.

By virtue of an aggregate of 1114, Fletcher took the Lauchheimer Trophy, a cup awarded to the shooter with the highest total in both the rifle and pistol matches. He was also awarded the Marine Corps Individual Pistol Trophy, awarded this year for the first time.

WO Mark W. Billing, 1st Marine Division, took second in the Lauchheimer with an aggregate of 1098, while Capt Thurman E. Barrier, Parris Island, was third with 1097.

MSgt Fletcher placed in the Western Division competition this year. A member of the National Pistol Team in 1940, he has competed at Quantico four times. In addition to the awards won this year, he is holder of the Distinguished Pistol Shot Award and the first silver leg of the rifle award.

Other winners in the pistol match:

1. WO Robert C. McIntyre, MB, Quantico, 548 D/PS
2. WO Mark W. Billing, 1st Marine Division, 543 D/PS
3. LtCol Robert D. Moser, MB, Quantico, 536 D/PS
4. LtCol Glenn C. Funk, 1st Marine Division, 535 Score only
5. Capt Thurman E. Barrier, Parris Island, 535 D/PS
6. SSgt Johnnie W. Hunter, SerrCom, FMF, Pac, 532 1st Gold
7. CWO Leonard A. Oderman, Pearl Harbor, 528 D/PS
8. TSgt Walter L. Devine, MB, Quantico, 527 D/PS

✿ **PERHAPS MOST EXCITING** of all the matches was the firing for the Elliot Trophy. The result of the match depended upon one shot—the last one. The team from Balboa, Canal Zone, was

leading the 2d Marine Division by four points. The last man to fire for the 2d Division scored a three. Had the shot been a four or five there would have been a tie or the 2d Division would have won the match.

Going from last place to first the Balboa team scored an aggregate of 1105; the 2d Division 1104. The score of both teams is as follows:

Name and rank	200	200	300	500	600	Total
BALBOA, CANAL ZONE	sf	rf	rf	sf	sf	
Team Captain						
Burri, Alvin W., 2dLt	42	46	45	45	90	268
Team Coach						
Davis, Edison C., TSgt						
Mahan, Burton R., Cpl	42	44	45	46	97	274
Compton, Miles E., Cpl	46	50	48	48	89	281
Eriksson, H. D., Cpl	48	48	48	47	91	282
Alternate						
Galyon, Golburn B., PFC						Aggregate—1105

2D MARINE DIVISION

Team Captain

Prickett, William F., LtCol

Team Coach

Whitaker, Earl W., CWO

Woodfin, J. W., WO	45	44	47	47	95	278
Humphrey, M. E., MSgt	44	48	47	47	89	275
Anderson, Gail E., WO	47	50	47	47	93	284
Jacisin, W. J., MSgt	43	46	43	46	89	267

Aggregate—1104

✿ **THE WESTERN DIVISION** overwhelmed all opponents in the Interdivision Rifle Matches, topping the nearest team by 32 points. Captained by LtCol Henry P. Crowe and coached by 1stLt Kenneth E. Harker, the members of the team are MSgt Walter E. Fletcher, MSgt William L. Jordan, Jr., MSgt Reginald Muckleroy, and TSgt Oscar T. Bowen. Their aggregate score was 2802.

The teams finished in the following order:

Team	Score
Western Division	2802
Southeastern Division	2770
Eastern Division	2749
1st Marine Division	2709
Pacific Division	2701
2d Marine Division	2698

Particularly outstanding on timed fire, the Eastern Division won first place honors in the Interdivisional Pistol Matches. They scored an aggregate of 1351. Led by Capt Harold J. Thomas



MSgt Walter E. Fletcher, left, nosed out WO Robert E. McIntyre, right, in Marine Corps Pistol Competition. MSgt Fletcher scored a 550, while WO McIntyre shot 548.

and coached by 1stLt Arthur A. Compton and CWO Raymond D. Chaney, the team members included CWO Raymond D. Chaney, 1stLt Arthur A. Compton, MSgt George D. Woods, and SSgt William J. Dynes, Jr.

Team scores were as follows:

Team	Score
Eastern Division	1351
Western Division	1296
Pacific Division	1293
Southeastern Division	1291
1st Marine Division	1285
2d Marine Division	1272

The rifle match course for individual competitions was fired with a total of 120 rounds at ranges of 200, 300, 500, and 600 yards. The individual pistol match course called for 60 shots at ranges of 25 to 50 yards. Team matches, fired at the same ranges, required only 60 shots for the rifle course and 30 shots for the pistol course.

The final team award, the Wirgman Trophy, was presented to the team from Newport, Rhode Island. This trophy is awarded to the team representing a detachment of 300 men or under. In this way smaller bases having few expert marksmen have an opportunity to compete for a trophy.

Throughout the entire week of firing the weather was above par, although on some days it was necessary to blacken sights heavier than usual due to the brilliant sun.

In ceremonies at the 600-yard line on June 5th, the medal and trophy winners were addressed by MajGen Pedro A. Del Valle and MajGen Clifton B. Gates. Gen Del Valle, well-known Marine artilleryman, presented the awards. A brief resume of medal winners:

Marine Corps Rifle Competition Medal Winners

Capt Gus C. Daskalakis	Gold
TSgt Maxin R. Beebe	1st Gold
WO John W. Woodfin	Gold
WO Ferdinand J. Bergmann	Gold
2dLt George C. Blair, Jr.	Gold
CWO Edwin F. Hassig	Gold—D/Mks.
1st Lt Louis M. Patterson	Gold—D/Mks.
SSgt Stephen S. P. Czompoly	2nd Gold
SSgt William J. Dynes, Jr.	4th Silver
TSgt Leo O. A. Manzerol	5th Silver
MSgt Louis E. Painter	2d Bronze
MSgt James Y. Henderson	3d Bronze
TSgt James R. Killough	5th Bronze
CWO Thomas R. Carpenter	Bronze
Capt Orville L. Bibb	Bronze
Capt Joseph C. Schwalke	Bronze
CWO Ernest W. Kray	Bronze
Capt John L. Kelly	Bronze
MSgt John R. Snyder	6th Bronze
MSgt George D. Woods	7th Bronze
Cpl William D. Johnston	8th Bronze
1stLt Fred F. Eubanks, Jr.	Bronze
WO Gail E. Anderson	Bronze
PFC Averil L. Butcher	9th Bronze
TSgt Arthur E. Snyder	10th Bronze

Marine Corps Pistol Competition Medal Winners

MSgt Walter E. Fletcher	Gold
SSgt Johnnie W. Hunter	1st Gold
MSgt Avant M. Brannock	2d Silver
MSgt Olaf C. Nelson	1st Bronze
TSgt Edison C. Davis	2d Bronze
Cpl Harold D. Ericksson	3d Bronze
MSgt Madison E. Humphrey	4th Bronze
MSgt Herbert B. Horn	5th Bronze
CWO Walter H. Beicke	Bronze

Pacific Division Medal Winners

CWO James W. Dorsey	DPS, Div Pistol Gold
TSgt Roy F. Rice	D/Mks.
1stLt John A. Hughes	Div Rifle Silver,
	Div Pistol Silver
2dLt Harry Lee	Div Rifle Bronze,
	Div Pistol Silver
Capt John L. Kelly	Div Rifle Bronze,
	Div Pistol Silver
Capt Samuel A. Johnstone	Dv Rifle Bronze
2dLt George G. Blair	Dv Rifle Bronze
PFC Averil L. Butcher	Dv Rifle Bronze
CWO Walter H. Beicke	Div Pistol Silver
Capt Rex E. Michaels	Div Pistol Bronze

Western Division Medal Winners

MSgt William C. Hoyt, Jr.	D/Mks.,
	Div Rifle Bronze
MSgt John M. Kozak	D/Mks.
TSgt Oscar T. Bowen	D/Mks.
MSgt James O. DeLahunt	D/Mks.
MSgt Reginald Muckleroy	D/Mks.
TSgt Raymond R. Becker	D/Mks.
TSgt Theodore F. Wade	D/Mks.

Eastern Division Pistol Competition Winners

TSgt Walter L. Devine	1st Gold
Sgt Clifton T. Walker	1st Silver
MSgt Avant M. Brannock	2d Silver
Cpl Burt H. Rickard	1st Bronze
SSgt William J. Dynes, Jr.	2d Bronze
SSgt Clarence J. Buck	3d Bronze

Eastern Division Rifle Competition Medal Winners

MSgt John A. Ward, Jr.	1st Gold
TSgt Fred H. Butcher, Jr.	2d Gold
SSgt William J. Dynes, Jr.	1st Silver
MSgt George D. Woods	2d Silver
MSgt Ray H. McNeil	3d Silver
MSgt Page H. Holmes	4th Silver
Sgt Vincent J. McGale	1st Bronze
PFC Alan A. Utrecht	2d Bronze
TSgt Alfred Nemec	3d Bronze
PFC Leslie A. Gerald	4th Bronze
TSgt William R. Caine	5th Bronze
PFC Elroy A. Kamrath	6th Bronze

**Lauchheimer Trophy***Southeastern Division Medal Winners*

MSgt Angelo A. Steriti	DM, Div Rifle Gold,
	Div Pistol Silver
MSgt Frederick W. Huppert	DPS, Div Pistol Silver
TSgt Leland A. Nemitz	DPS, Div Pistol Bronze
MSgt Cletis B. Railing	D/Mks.,
	Div Rifle Silver
TSgt Everett L. Hesson	D/Mks.,
	Div Rifle Bronze
Cpl Miles E. Compton	Div Rifle Gold
TSgt Arthur E. Snyder	Div Rifle Gold
PFC Frank M. Gregory	Div Rifle Silver
PFC Joseph Witko, Jr.	Div Rifle Silver
MSgt Madison E. Humphrey	Div Rifle Silver,
	Div Pistol Silver
TSgt Irwin W. Johnson	Div Rifle Silver,
	Div Pistol Bronze
SSgt Carl Barrier	Div Rifle Silver
PFC Paul L. Caron	Div Rifle Silver,
	Div Pistol Silver
MSgt Frank J. Fazekas	Div Rifle Silver
TSgt Milo E. Lashua	Div Rifle Bronze
PFC Anthony Stefancic	Div Rifle Bronze
MSgt George H. Carrier	Div Rifle Bronze
PFC Calvin W. Glenn	Div Rifle Bronze
PFC William H. Milburn	Div Rifle Bronze
SSgt Floyd D. Hafer	Div Rifle Bronze,
	Div Pistol Bronze
PFC Neal P. Rutt	Div Rifle Bronze
Pvt Howard M. McGrath	Div Rifle Bronze
PFC Robert A. Graham	Div Rifle Bronze
TSgt Howard W. Hemphill	Div Rifle Bronze
Cpl Arthur G. Houff	Div Rifle Bronze
Cpl Russell J. Beilfuss	Div Rifle Bronze
Cpl Harold D. Eriksson	Div Pistol Gold
TSgt Edison C. Davis	Div Pistol Silver
MSgt Herbert B. Horn	Div Pistol Bronze
SSgt Charles H. Walker	Div Pistol Bronze
MSgt William J. Jacisin	Div Pistol Bronze

US MC

Operation Packard—

Amphibious Command Post Exercise

✿ IN MAY, 1947, STUDENTS OF THE AMPHIBIOUS Warfare School, Senior Course, in conjunction with students from the Junior Course, took part in an exercise which demonstrated the practical aspects of the amphibious problem and tied the elements of many months' instruction into a meaningful pattern. This culminating lesson was an amphibious command post exercise, representing a corps landing.

In January, 1947, a planning staff for "Operation Packard" was established. It included a problem director and representatives from each academic section of Marine Corps Schools. Under the supervision of the Director, Senior Course, detailed planning was begun at this time.

Several possible sites for the exercise were considered. The Quantico area itself was discarded because the limited water area (Potomac River) would inject too many artificialities into the ship-to-shore movement. The Little Creek, Virginia, area was discarded because of restricted and undesirable terrain inland from the beaches. The Camp Lejeune area was finally chosen as the most favorable location because realism could be achieved in the disposition of naval vessels, the terrain inland was suitable, and the beach conditions would illustrate the practical problems connected with the movement of materiel across beaches that are exposed to the open sea.

The problem was oriented at the Landing Force-Attack Force level, to include enough air units to represent the close support, reconnaissance, and observation agencies normally found in the attack force, as well as the key elements of the naval gunfire and control components of such a force. In harmony with this concept, the students of the Senior and Junior Courses were organized in staffs at the level of corps, but limitations in communication personnel available made it necessary to set up only five staffs: a

corps staff, two division staffs, and two regimental staffs represented in one of the divisions.

✿ IN RECOGNITION of the limitations imposed on the Navy by the pressure of economy, only a minimum number of ships was requested. Since it was desirable that a direct support ship be assigned to each student echelon of the landing force—to provide actual, working contact with the Navy in employing naval gunfire—recommendations were made that five fire support ships be provided.

In January, 1947, the Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet, advised

the Commandant, Marine Corps Schools, of the identity of vessels which were being made available. These included three APAs, three destroyers, two LSMRs, and two PCEs. During February, members of the planning staff presented the concept of the exercise to the Commander, Amphibious Force, Atlantic Fleet, in a conference on his flagship. Following this conference, many communications were exchanged to facilitate planning. In March, the Commander, Transport Squadron Two, was appointed as the Task Force Commander for the exercise, and members of the planning staff conferred with him to orient the naval staff, fix a schedule for the exercise, and resolve other details needing coordination between the school and participating naval elements.

One of the biggest problems, that of acquiring ships and achieving liaison with the Navy, had been overcome; but another big problem remained. The scope of the exercise depended to a large extent on the communication personnel and equipment that would be available. Communications are, in fact, the heart of any command post exercise. The problem lay in the fact that the school's organization included only a part of the requirements in such personnel and equipment. Correspondence asking assistance in communications was one of the first steps in prepar-

By Maj Howard Rice

Under remarkably realistic conditions, officer students from Quantico and 2d Division marines participate in a mock landing at Camp Lejeune. Umpires controlled the exercise in a manner that emphasized the principles of an amphibious attack

ing the exercise. A request for outside help, made to Headquarters, Marine Corps, was granted in October, 1946. Later, the number of personnel was augmented by the 2d Marine Division upon request from the school. Arrangements were eventually concluded to obtain almost three hundred men, with appropriate equipment, from Marine Corps Schools, Marine Air Control Group One, and the 2d Marine Division. Assembling communicators from several sources was a handicap, but an intensive field program, conducted prior to embarkation, was a successful means of orienting the communication teams and checking all equipment.

IN THE REMAINING MONTHS of preparations by the school staff, the basic structure of problem information was fixed in the *General* and *Special Situations*, and a system of umpire control was designed for exerting supervision over the students and providing an impetus in the execution of the problem. This umpire system was extensive and unique and will be described a little later.

The *General* and *Special Situations* of the problem were framed to indicate the logic of an amphibious attack in the Lejeune-New River area by a force of one amphibious corps, and provided all the information that was essential to the students for preparing complete plans. Insofar as possible, information given to the students approximated that which could normally be expected in an actual operation.

In the initial phases of the staff planning for this exercise it was determined that the students' efforts should be tested against an actual plan of defense. Experience in previous command post exercises had proven the value of a cohesive opposition which was reasonable and consistent, and had illustrated the unfavorable results in student achievement when individual umpires were expected to influence the situation with extemporaneous brainstorming. Therefore, in the early stages of the problem's inception an instructor was designated as "Defense Umpire." With absolutely no knowledge of the students' schemes of maneuver, this instructor drew up a plan for the defense of the Southeastern coast

of the United States by a Black force, and included logical plans for counterattack against a landing in the objective area as well as in other localities. Enemy units employed in this defense were those assigned to the defending force by the Intelligence Section and constituted a well-balanced force that could reasonably be expected to engage in such a mission. Later, during the conduct of the exercise, the Defense Umpire acted as Defense Commander and maneuvered the defending units in logical reaction to student maneuvers, applying sound principles and realistic time and space factors. The plan of this defense was issued to all umpires and served as the main guide in the control of the problem.

Student participation began on 1 May 1947, when an orientation was held for 146 members of both the Senior and Junior Courses and 55 instructors. Representatives from each of the school's academic sections explained their respective sections in the *General* and *Special Situations* and made certain that all students were accurately introduced to the considerations, both simulated and actual, involved. Following this, the five student staffs were provided with adequate office space and clerical assistance for setting up command posts. In the period 1-9 May student planning proceeded concurrently at all echelons.

In this period, the planning staff, composed of those instructors who had done the spadework on the problem, functioned as "Director Headquarters." It acted as higher headquarters, maintained actual liaison with the Navy, supervised the students' performance of staff duties, gave technical advice when requested, and in addition supervised the orientation and planning of the umpires. In acting on requests presented by the landing force staff (Students), Director Headquarters played the part of Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic and Commander Task Force 82 — except in the case of requests dealing with naval gunfire and the ship-to-shore plan. Naval officers from the attack force staff were present to deal with these subjects. In this arrangement the students came to grips with the practical problems of reconciling landing force requirements with naval capabilities.

THE PHYSICAL ASPECTS of the problem began on 9 May when embarkation of equipment was begun. Loading of materiel was completed by noon of 10 May, and all personnel embarked during the afternoon. The embarkation scheme placed Corps Headquarters and Director Headquarters aboard one APA (USS *Fremont*), the two division staffs aboard the USS *Okanagan*, and the two regimental staffs on the USS *Oka-loosa*. In this way the best advantage was taken of the limited shipping available in order to make communication relations between the echelons as realistic as possible. The *Fremont* had been modified to function as an AGC and provided the best facilities among the three ships for a Corps staff.

After sailing down the Potomac and making a rendezvous with the destroyers, LSMRs and PCEs, a rehearsal was held at the Camp Pendleton (Virginia Beach) area on 12 May. The ship-to-shore movement of the preferred plan was executed, but modified in certain details to prevent damage to the valuable communication equipment. Communications were established between the echelons of the landing force and drill messages were transmitted. All staffs displaced ashore and gained some critical information of the practical aspects of the ship-to-shore movement. It was at this time that the student staffs realized the need for careful, detailed plans in the displacement of command posts from ship to beach, if control was to be maintained over subordinate units.

The rehearsal was completed in late afternoon of 12 May and the ships put to sea for the approach to New River. During the voyage, the students corrected their debarkation plans which, in some cases, had proven inadequate in the rehearsal. Simulating the reality of such an approach, the task force received and passed to lower units a continuous series of messages about enemy air and naval activity, and the results of friendly UDT and bombardment operations. Late aerial photographs were also issued, showing new targets and damage to old ones.

ON 14 MAY the first wave landed on the Lejeune beaches at 0958. Since the student staffs were all of sufficiently high echelon to be excluded from the initial waves, the Navy represented the assault waves with a skeleton pattern in order to exercise boat crews, the control vessels, and to land its beach party personnel.

The problem developed rapidly in accordance

with the students' scheme of maneuver, as they were reflected upon the plan of defense. Umpires began a logical introduction of enemy information, in the form of captured documents, prisoners, and identification of units — a process that continued throughout the problem.

Because of actual naval considerations involved in the exercise — ships, landing boats, and ships' communications — the problem of control by the umpires was complex, requiring a large cadre of personnel and a great deal of preparatory effort by the school staff. The umpire system was devised to perform two main functions: 1) Observe the students' individual performance of duty during the conduct of the exercise; 2) Control the exercise in a manner that would emphasize the principles of an amphibious attack, but at the same time leave the students free to use their own initiative as much as possible.

An umpire team was assigned to each student staff. In most cases these umpires were required to act as subordinate and supporting units which implemented the students' plans and orders and reacted logically. Director Headquarters coordinated and controlled all the umpire teams with lower echelons. In addition, the Defense Umpire, who acted as commander of the enemy defenses, was in communication with all umpire teams and informed the lower unit staffs (regiments in this case) of the defenders' actions, producing a flow of information from front to rear in a realistic style.

It is quite apparent that the success of this umpire system would depend heavily on the degree of coordination between umpires at separated echelons. Especially during the early phases of the landing, when some units would be ashore and others aboard ship, it was imperative that all umpires, no matter their location, present a synchronized situation to the students should communications among umpires fail.

THE COMPREHENSIVE DEFENSE PLAN, mentioned earlier, was one of the instruments for insuring this coordination. Each umpire team was provided with a "control overlay," on which was shown the disposition of all defending units and a plan for their entry into action. At any time the umpires could refer to the control overlay and determine immediately which enemy units were opposing the students' units at any point. Thus the umpires were in a position to evaluate, at least theoretically, the result of all decisions made and orders issued by the student

commanders by impinging the maneuvers of one force upon the maneuvers of the other. If the enemy's plan, as originally conceived by the defense umpire, was unprepared for an attack at a certain place, the students would be allowed to succeed accordingly. Through this technique the students were opposed by an enemy whom they could analyze well enough to generate logical plans to fight.

Besides the control overlay, each umpire team was armed with a "master schedule of events," which outlined in chronological sequence the general trend of events that would affect each staff within definite brackets of time. Since each umpire represented from two to four different units (a necessity due to the number of umpires available), the need for keeping up with several situations, which were apt to vary considerably from one another, placed heavy demands on the umpire's memory and imagination. In anticipation of this difficulty, each umpire was furnished check-off lists concerning his specific units. The check list set forth key facts as to the capabilities of the particular unit, (in accordance with the students' plan for its employment, and included pertinent time and space factors to assist the umpire in reporting that unit's progress. The action of the student staffs was thus affected by the umpires when they submitted situation reports, summaries of action, or requested support.

In addition to this system of control which functioned aboard ship and on the beach, a method was provided for introducing time, space, and boat-availability factors in the simulated ship-to-shore movement of the corps. A logistical umpire from each team was stationed aboard the appropriate control vessel, with direct communication to his umpire chief, who was with the student staff. Since the pretended landing of a corps involved the movement over the water of some 82,000 men, 6,000 vehicles, and 105,000 tons of supplies, the purpose of the logistical umpire was to insure realism in the control of these simulated elements. In keeping with present doctrine, each element to be landed on order was assigned a serial number by the students, and the logistical umpire was advised when a certain serial was ordered to land. He then applied a time and space factor to cover debarkation, movement, and the landing time. Boat availability was also computed to assess any delay that might be logically necessary if there were insufficient boats to transport the serial when ordered. In certain cases these serials were

actually represented by cards. When the order was issued to land one of these "carded" serials, the APA would place the card in a boat, and order the coxswain to take it to the appropriate control vessels, where it would be directed to the proper beach. This technique of card-representation worked satisfactorily and gave useful exercise to the naval control system, landing force logistical control groups, and emphasized the realities of time and space.

During the exercise the umpire system worked very favorably to make sure that each decision of a student commander on the ground resulted in some logical result. A realistic situation arose on the first night, when one division had its advance message center and assistant division commander ashore but was unable to land the remainder of its headquarters. Communications between the two echelons were poor, and the assistant division commander had to assume command ashore, lay plans for the night defense, and for renewing the attack the next morning.

☛ IMMEDIATELY upon completion of the exercise, in the afternoon of the second day, those units which had been furnished by the 2d Marine Division were returned directly to their parent organization. All transportation and enlisted personnel scheduled to return to Quantico were moved by road to Morehead City, North Carolina, where re-embarkation could be accomplished without interference from the heavy surf that was running at Lejeune. During the day of 17 May, when all officers were aboard the *Oka-loosa* en route to Quantico, a critique was held.

This exercise illustrated very well the practical considerations in planning an amphibious attack in company with the Navy and in actually executing the plans as prepared. The fact that all recommendations and decisions had actual effect on personnel, ships, boats, and aircraft achieved the desirable objective of stressing the responsibility attached to command and staff positions. Although the problem was concerned primarily with instruction for students of the Senior and Junior Courses of the Marine Corps Schools, it was made clear that such an exercise is admirable training for amphibious forces of the Navy. Limited peacetime budgets have the effect of reducing the scope of training exercises, but in an exercise of this nature great realism and a broad scope can be attained at a cost in naval means well within the most restricted operating budget.

US ☛ MC

The Marines In The Pacific War

Chapter 13

THE MARIANAS; PLANS AND PRELIMINARIES

IN DESULTORY CONVERSATIONS AND OCCASIONALLY during those staff conferences held every morning in the dun-colored building overlooking Pearl Harbor from Makalapa Drive, Adm Nimitz had not infrequently expressed his desire to see the Star-Spangled Banner floating over Truk, which still held its place in American imaginations as the mighty fortress of Japan in the south and the symbol of the enemy's power by sea. There was even some talk that the CINCPAC¹ might fly his own flag afloat for such an operation, which would surely bring the long-invisible Japanese fleet forth for that showdown battle every American seaman desired. The suggestion came less from the Admiral himself than from those juniors who are quick to expand every hint into a statement, but it illustrates the state of mind; and it was a state of mind shared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington, as Nimitz was informed at one of the periodic meetings between himself and Adm King when the two came together on the Pacific coast, the one flying across the Continent, the other across an ocean.

The original long-range plan was for an assault on Truk in September 1944, when so many new fleet units would be ready and so many troops available. But now two things had changed; the Japanese air force had shown itself both weak and timorous during the great sweep of Task Force 58 from Truk to the Marianas, and our own losses on Bougainville had been so unexpectedly light that no less than three divisions of marines with nearly a fourth would be ready for action by June. These were the 2d, 3d, and 4th Divisions, with the 1st Provisional Brigade containing the 4th and 22d Regiments and attached troops; add the Army 27th and 77th Divisions and there would be a force two corps strong.

The position at sea was not less favorable; three of our carriers were temporarily out of action but one of these (*Lexington*) would soon

be repaired and there were three new ones. The escort carriers had shown themselves capable of providing the necessary close support for beachhead work. It was thus possible to contemplate detaching the whole of the fast carrier force for a fleet action without seriously decreasing the help given from sea to the marines ashore.

The invasion of Truk was accordingly advanced from September to June and the planners began to work on it. But before March

By Fletcher Pratt

Maps by PFC John R. Beveridge

had run its course opposition to the idea began to develop, it would seem chiefly from the group centering round Adm Spruance. Truk, these officers insisted, now had no more importance than Wotje or Jaluit; neither our submarine scouts around the place nor the B-24s now bombing reported major Japanese ships there. It was time (they said) to apply the doctrine of seizing an advanced base in the midst of the enemy's holdings on an oceanic scale; time to go not to Truk but to Saipan and Guam in the Marianas—break through the Japanese defense line running down those islands from metropolitan Japan by way of the Bonins, Iwo Jima, and the Marianas to Yap and Palau.

It was a bold concept, but not too bold for Nimitz who, at a staff conference in earliest April, asked proponents of each view—Saipan or Truk—to sum up their cases. When they had finished the Admiral asked one question: "Which will damage the enemy most?" and the matter was decided.

Nevertheless, there were lions in the path. From Eniwetok, whose fine anchorage would make it the forward staging base, it is over 1,000 miles to Saipan; from Pearl Harbor to Eniwetok it is 2,375, totaling an oceanic distance. It was clearly impossible to consider reinforcement convoys moving in several echelons across such spaces as they had done at Bougainville; the expeditions, with all resources for a major land campaign, must go in a single piece. The project was not dissimilar to invading the shores of Europe direct from New York.


¹At this period Admiral Nimitz' title had been changed from Commander-in-Chief Pacific to Commander-in-Chief Pacific Ocean Area.

The enemy could stage in his own land-based planes from the Empire; we would have none. Yap, Ponape, Woleai, and Truk were within bombing range of the areas where supply ships must lie till unloaded. Above all there was the intimate prospect that the Japanese Navy would come out for a final reckoning while the invaders were astride the beaches. Every prewar military and civilian examination of a Japanese-American conflict² had reached the conclusion that the great battle of the navies would come when our forces attempted to repossess Guam and there were in existence maps with a cross 100 miles or more southwest of that island where the clash would most likely take place.

These were the problems. Adm Spruance had over-all command as head of the Fifth Fleet; he could see further into the complications of such a situation than any other leader and would keep his eyes more steadily on the overruling consideration of establishing our forces ashore. For the fast fleet Marc Mitscher, his flag in a carrier; for the battleships Willis Augustus Lee. Also, under Spruance, Richmond Kelly Turner led the Amphibious Forces; clearly the best man in that business, though explosive and temperamental; but he had worked much with Spruance in the past, the two understood each other and got along together. Holland Smith, now lieutenant general, was given command of all expeditionary forces, tantamount to an army in strength.

This corps would attack Saipan on 15 June with the 2d and 4th Marine Divisions, the Army 27th Division being in reserve afloat. As soon as the success of that operation was assured, which should not be too long, as intelligence estimates showed only some 5-6,000 Japanese on the island, the III Phib Corps, under MajGen Geiger, would be called up from Guadalcanal and launched against Guam. It was anticipated that at most two regimental combat teams of the 27th would be called into the Saipan fighting, probably in the last stages. This organization could thus serve as a reserve for the Guam attack also. As soon as Saipan was clear the V Corps would take Tinian. These were the

²cf. Hector Bywaters' "Great Pacific War."



only important Marianas. Rota had an airfield but it would be insignificant with the larger installations of Guam-Saipan-Tinian in our hands. The Japs would hardly have time to complete the strip on which they had been rather unimpressively toiling on Pagan Island and the remainder of the Marianas were hot rocks inhabited chiefly by melancholy sea birds. The 77th Division was to remain in distant reserve at Hawaii.

REHEARSALS at Maui went off with a pleasing smoothness. The captain of each transport visited the unit he was to carry and had a long talk with the troop officers, so that the loading went smoothly also, delayed only a single day by the Pearl Harbor explosion, when an LST blew up on 21 May while loading ammunition and communicated the fire to six others, all being lost plus 200 men. On 8 June the armada rendezvoused at Eniwetok, much cheered by the radio flash of Eisenhower's men at last in France. If the fleet that went to the Marshalls had been one of the largest that ever sailed, there was no question about this, the exclusive superlative could be applied without modification. The ships

Part XI: Intricate plans for the landings on Saipan, Tinian, Guam are plotted. H-Hour is preceded by pre-landing bombardment from sea and air and a quick carrier strike at Japanese reinforcements coming down from Iwo Jima and the homeland

were 775 in number and could not be seen by a single eye, even from a plane; there were 100,000 marching men and a quarter million sailors.

Yet no one thought it would be easy. Three times since the preliminary estimate planes had flown over Saipan for photos and each photo showed almost feverish work on the new defense positions, each plane saw new ships in the harbor, and our submarines reported traffic heavy from the Empire to the Marianas. The final G-2 estimate jumped the number of troops on Saipan to 10-12,000.

On the command ship *Rocky Mount* Gen Holland Smith was not elated. "We are through with the flat atolls now. We learned how to pulverize atolls but now we are up against mountains and caves where the Japs can dig in and a week from today there will be a lot of dead marines." As the correspondents left the room where they were being briefed Richmond Kelly Turner indicated the general, as he remarked to correspondent Bob Sherrod; "He can estimate the enemy capabilities better than any man aboard."

II


✿ VICEADM CHUICHI NAGUMO, commander of the Central Pacific Fleet, had moved his headquarters to the Mariana Gunto. He was an extremely big pot, who had commanded the forces afloat in the Pearl Harbor attack and later at Midway and Santa Cruz—though not quite as big a pot as he thought he was, for after Yamamoto was shot down in the Solomons, it was revealed that that officer had named as his heir to his own high office not Nagumo but the unfortunate Yamaguchi, who had been killed aboard the *Hiryu* at Midway. The command ashore was not the normal assignment of such magnifico, but the political pressures in Tokyo had been building up so seriously that a major naval officer was believed to be needed in the inner South Seas Defense Area. Under the impulse of the Jushin, Shinusuka Kishi of the Commerce and Agriculture Department and Manoru Shigemitsu, the Foreign Minister, had threatened to resign. Tojo would evidently have to reconstruct his whole Cabinet and the navy people were hopeful that in the reshuffling that would inevitably attend such a process a revision of the unsatisfactory chain of command in the Central Pacific Area could be achieved.

✿ THIS CHAIN OF COMMAND was itself the result of a haste with which Tojo had been forced

to revise both his political and his military arrangements after the simultaneous attack on Truk and loss of the Marshalls. That double even foreshadowed an attack by the Americans somewhere in the Central Pacific and without even consulting the Navy the Premier set up a new 31st Army command with the aged, solemn, and respectable LtGen Saito at its head, for the defense of the island barrier. The general received his command on 25 February; made obeisance at the palace the next day, and on the 27th was in Saipan. Three days later he went down to Palau by seaplane to wait on Adm Koga, commander of the Combined Fleet, aboard his flagship *Yamato*. The two officers had dinner and then discussed strategy, after which Adm Koga remarked that he had no orders from the Imperial Naval Staff in Tokyo relative to command in the Central Pacific and Saito flew back to Guam, where there was a good deal to do. The transport *Sakito Maru* had been sunk by an American submarine with the 118th Infantry aboard and the survivors had just arrived in a deplorable state and without arms.

The General was busy with these men and with inspecting the shores of Saipan, when on 10 March to his intense surprise, he received an order from Koga unifying all commands in the area under the authority of the Central Pacific Fleet. The staff officer who brought it was very disagreeable, pointing out that the Navy controlled all supplies. Gen Saito considered the procedure indecent and the scheme of command set forth in the order as vague and irritating. There was a series of debates, acrid and hissing, which lasted for weeks, during which the troops sent down from the Empire for the defense of the Central Pacific Area underwent some remarkable shuffling, the case of the 8th Expeditionary Unit being typical.

This was one of Tojo's Amphibious Brigades under a new name. It embarked at Fusan in the Matsu No. 2 convoy on 1 March under orders for Truk by way of Saipan. En route the Imperial General Staff decided to strengthen the Saipan garrison instead and placed it under Saito's command, but before it could reach him, Adm Koga's order was issued. The Tokyo staff suddenly realized that under the terms of the order the 8th Expeditionary Unit would now be under naval command, so they ordered it to Truk after all. In the meanwhile one of the American submarines, which were becoming very annoying, got into the convoy and sank one



transport, also the escort flag, the cruiser *Tatsuta*, which had all the unit's records aboard.³ A new set of records had to be prepared as the convoy lay over in Saipan Harbor and while this was being done the Navy insisted that since the unit was afloat it was under naval command and could be sent wherever they pleased.

The result of all these and similar arguments was naturally a compromise which satisfied nobody. The general lines were that army and navy commanders should continue to control their own troops (Special Naval Landing and Base Forces in the case of the latter) under ordinary circumstances. "It is unnecessary that certain forces be organized under a unified command," said the document initialed by staff officers for the heads of both services. Naval and Army troops were not to trespass on the areas under the other's command. But as soon as the enemy commenced a landing operation on any island all the forces there would immediately fall under the authority of the senior officer present, whether he belonged to Army or Navy. The Navy should be responsible for developing each island's resources for defense, the necessary

³This was the work of *Sandlance*.

laborers being furnished by the Army. General Saito would be responsible for the land defenses of the Bonins and the Mariana Gunto, the Navy for the land defenses of the Carolines; but Navy base forces in the western Carolines would take orders from the Army general commanding in that area as regards operations ashore. (This is somewhat difficult for an Occidental mind to understand; the answer is that the Orientals did not understand it either. It was one of those arrangements common among Japanese who cannot agree, purposely over-intricate, so that the question of who is to give the effective orders in any case is thrown into the domain of individual personalities.)

A secondary result of these debates and command shuffling was that until the matter was settled to the dissatisfaction of both services, no reinforcement convoys at all were dispatched to the Inner South Seas Area, that is for nearly a month. When they resumed, American submarine activity had been greatly intensified and the attacks on these craft added to the confusion of commands. In April, for example, the submarines sank almost an entire convoy bringing part of the 52d Division down past Saipan for

the Carolines. Only 300 men of the 150th Infantry Regiment from that division were rescued and there was a good deal of question about whose command they were now under.

Nevertheless, the Imperial Staff persisted in its reinforcement program. By early June it had succeeded in furnishing Gen Saito with 22,702 Army troops, the bulk of which belonged to the 43d (Nagoya) Division and the 47th Independent Mixed Brigade, commanded by Col Oka.⁴ These troops were all in good shape with the exception of one regiment of the 43d which had been torpedoed in its transport, the soldiers losing all their weapons. There was a tank regiment with 50 medium and about 12 light tanks; a couple of vehicle companies, the survivors of the 150th Regiment, with similar weaponless survivors from the 9th Expeditionary Unit, two mortar battalions, an engineer regiment, and another tank regiment. Arms were lacking for some 7,000 of the people, who were the relics of the Tateyama convoy, that lost five big transports out of seven in a concerted and persistent submarine attack of 4-6 June, when over 2,000 soldiers drowned. Adm Nagumo had the 1st Yokosuka Special Naval Landing Force, a few Naval Guard Troops, and the men and planes (120) of the 22d Air Flotilla, totaling 6,960 men on morning report.

THE SUBMARINE ACTIVITY which cut the number of troops in the Mariana Gunto also interfered with the construction of defenses, to which Gen Saito addressed himself as soon as the command problem was straightened out. He considered Saipan the most vital of the islands and had sent only 4,700 to Tinian and 13,000 to Guam. A single battalion held Pagan. Inspections both on the ground and from the air led him to the conclusion that at Saipan there were only three areas with beaches suitable for the American type of landing—on the extreme southern face (but that was covered by reefs), around the island's main town of Garapan about half way along its western flank, and at the southwestern tip of the island, embracing the sugar mill town of Charan Kanoa, the most probable point of attack. Desirable as it would be to construct positions around the ravines and natural caves of Mt Tapochau at the center of the island, the

General held (in accordance with normal Japanese doctrine) that island defense could most successfully be conducted at the beach. Since materials and labor were lacking for the construction of both beach and mountain projects, he used what he had to build up positions along the Charan Kanoa shore.

THE INTENT was to line this full four-mile strip with barriers and pillboxes giving flanking fire from machine guns, 20 and 37mm antiaircraft guns, as in the Tarawa defenses. Behind these and at the first ridge line mortars were to be in place and registered on the beaches; behind these again, on the rising slopes, the artillery. The tank regiment and the bulk of the infantry forces were to be held approximately at the line of the battery positions, ready to counter-attack any survivors of the American force who remained on the beaches when darkness fell. Unhappily, several shiploads of steel and concrete for the beach defenses were lost through "the hazards of the ocean" (as the General put it) and replacements had only begun to come by May. Some work was done by that time, including the digging of field trenches; now everything was pushed forward more vigorously and guns began to be mounted. The General reported at this time that he considered the Mariana Gunto as "the final defensive position of the homeland" and that he would complete his "strong positions which will make fire point a backbone" by the middle of August. By November he expected to have fortified a series of cave and terrace positions in from the beach line and around the important Aslito airfield at the southern end of the island.

The precise state of affairs in June was that 16 105mm howitzers, 30 75mm field pieces, and 8 155s were in position behind the Charan Kanoa and Oreai beaches—divisional and brigade artillery, immobile because the prime movers had been sunk on the sea, and with the emplacements around them incomplete. At Agingan there were a pair of British 6-inch from Singapore; on Nafutan Point four more and another pair at Garapan covering the harbor, which is known as Tanapag. All around Magicienne Bay, which was a Navy command area, and which Adm Nagumo expected the Americans to use as an anchorage, were batteries under his control. They aggregated four fine 200mm mortars, three 140s, and four 120s. Aslito Field had eight dual purpose 120s and

⁴There is no absolute certainty that this was our old friend of Guadalcanal, who sneaked off after leaving the farewell note for his troops, but the name is not particularly common in Japanese and it is most unusual to find a colonel in command of a brigade unless he has a good deal of influence, so this is probably the same old Oka.

a pair of 75s. Both ammunition chambers and emplacements for all but the divisional and brigade guns were incomplete; nor had any positions been made ready for six more 200mm mortars and 32 120s in Garapan Naval Depot.

A meeting of all officers was called by the chief of staff, who told them for themselves and for their soldiers that there had been too much of suicide in the other islands. They should by no means consider destroying themselves if the enemy made progress. One lieutenant wrote in his notebook that he was deeply moved by this speech. "We shall crush the enemy by living." Adm Nagumo meanwhile had become very apprehensive about the slowness of the Army men in getting things done. In an effort to stir them, he showed Saito the report he was sending to Tokyo—"It is a certainty that the enemy will attack the Marianas this month or next."

III

✿ ONE OF THE ODDEST features of Operation Forager, as the attack on Saipan was called, is how correctly and yet incorrectly the Japanese commanders had divined the American plan. The Admiral was perfectly right as to the date, but he had set up his portions of the defenses around Magicienne Bay where Turner had no intention of attacking.* The General would not believe a word his colleague said about timing, but had selected for his main defense precisely the area where the marines were going ashore, on both sides of Charan Kanoa, with the 2d Marine Division beyond a jutting pier at the north end of the town, which formed a convenient divisional boundary landmark and the 4th Division south from there to Agingan Point.

The plan was for the regimental combat teams of the 23d and 25th Marines to land abreast in the latter area, those of the 6th and 8th Regiments to land abreast in the former, two battalions of each in the first wave. They would have the cover of a battleship and four destroyers in the south (*Tennessee, Bailey, Robinson, A. W. Grant, Norman Scott*), two cruisers at the center (*Birmingham, Indianapolis*), and a battleship and three destroyers at the north (*California, Halsey Powell, Coghlan, Monssen*), while off beyond the line of fire 24 LCI rocket gunboats formed line to throw in those missiles that had been so effective in Kwajalein.

This time there were plenty of those small craft like PCs and SCs to act as control ships for the transfer of troops from Higgins boats to the amphtracs which would carry the men across the reef line to the beach. There were eight battalions of these amphtracs, four manned by marines, four by the Army; DUKWs would handle the artillery. The CVEs would furnish close air support; their fighters would be supplied with the new "Holy Moses" rockets, to be employed here for the first time, where numerous caves and ravines promised them a particular utility. The aviators had trained with them but regarded the new weapons with unconcealed distrust and Army air observers with the expedition thought that this whole idea of close air support was, in the expression of their own field manual, "dangerous and unprofitable." A number of planes for the preliminary strike had white phosphorous bombs and belly tanks for burning off the cane fields in which the Japs might take cover.

The two remaining regiments (2d and 24th) were to move up in their transports to the Garapan area with the battleship *Colorado* and a couple of destroyers covering, to make a bluff at a landing, allow themselves to be apparently beaten off; then move down to the actual beaches and go ashore before dark of D day. As soon as the beaches were sufficiently clear, the 10th Regiment (Artillery) would follow the 2d Division infantry and the 14th Regiment the 4th Division; and as soon as it was possible after this an Army formation of heavy guns, the XXIV Corps Artillery, would follow the Marine cannon in, taking over all counter-battery work at the earliest possible moment.

It was hoped to reach the first phase line in the center of the position by night of D day, a region not far from 3,000 yards inland, enclosing the crests and looking down reverse slopes of the high central hills at that part of the island. The 2d Division would then hold on its left and swing its right toward the slopes of Mt Tapotchau; the 4th would branch out from it in a direction generally rightward to the southeast to get the big airfield, Aslito. There was a small airstrip right along the beach north of Charan Kanoa, but with the fire it would take and the fighting across it, there was little likelihood it could be used by anything more than grasshopper artillery observation planes for some time after the landing.

All told in that first landing group there were

*An earlier plan of landing one battalion in rubber boats at Magicienne Bay was abandoned as suicidal.

21,746 officers and men of the 2d Division and its attached elements, 21,618 of the 4th Division, 2,582 of the XXIV Corps Artillery. The key idea of the operation was to get this massive force on the beach quickly, under crushing fire from air and sea to break up the defensive formations which were expected to make their main fight at the beaches.

This was the amphibious plan then, and it looked air tight; but the amphib plan was something less than half of what Adm Spruance had to keep in mind. He must count on interruption from all the planes in the Empire and from the fleet invisible since the night of Santa Cruz, located by our submarines off Tawi Tawi, its air arm presumably again recruited to full strength. The plan worked out to protect the movement ashore against these counterstrokes, to throw confusion into the councils of Japan, and obtain surprise for the action at the beachhead—this plan went up even beyond 5th Fleet's level to embrace all the American forces around the rim of an ocean that occupies a quarter of the world.

☛ D DAY was 15 June; but the first airstrike on Saipan would be on the 12th from the fast carriers running ahead of the transport fleet, heavy fighter sweeps to ground any Japanese planes in the Marianas. Simultaneously, planes of the 7th Army Air Force in the Central Pacific and of the 5th Army Air Force in the Southwest Pacific were to attack in whatever force they could muster all the islands of the Carolines with Wake and Marcus. Far in the north more planes had come out of Adak for a blow against Kuriles and mysterious Paramushiru. Adm Small's cruisers from Dutch Harbor would run in before dawn (using radar if there were fog as there was almost certain to be) and shell the same place.⁵ Far to the west runways and bases for the B-29s had at last toilsomely been set up in Southern China. As Mitscher's carriers approached Saipan the big planes would take off and make a reality of what had been a nightmare to every Japanese since the war began by bombing the home islands.

Tinian and Saipan are within eyesight of each other; Spruance and Mitscher with the battleships and fast carriers were to run between this group and Guam, swinging north up the west flank of Saipan, and for a day the fast battleships would shell the place while the air attacks continued. This would be on the 14th; by that

date the slower escort carriers would be so close in that their planes could take over part of the aerial bombardment duty. It was expected that the enemy on Saipan would by this time have notified the homeland of the impending attack and need for reinforcement and that reinforcements would be on the way. On the night of the 13th, then, Indian Jocko Clark with his own carrier group and that of Adm Harrill, would run fast to the north, flying their planes off against Iwo Jima. They should catch the reinforcement just coming in and shoot them up in a fighter sweep, following this with a dive-bomber attack against Iwo Jima's shops and runways. The Japs would repair the latter quickly; but they could hardly do it in less than 24 hours and those 24 hours would be the crucial period of the landing.

Having struck at Iwo Jima, Clark and Harrill would turn back and join the fleet west of Saipan, then all the fast carriers together run down to Guam and Rota to complete the destruction of the airfields and ships there, lying off to await the coming of Adm Koga's fleet. There were six big seaplane tenders with the expedition, their squadrons of patrol planes still back at Eniwetok. By the time Clark and Harrill had rejoined Mitscher and the Guam fields had been bombed, it was expected that the operation ashore would have proceeded so far that Adm Turner could clear the anchorages off Saipan of some of his transports and support ships. One or more of the tenders would come in and fly out planes for a long-range search to the west to supplement the work of the submarines which were always out there but which could cover comparatively little of the ocean.

☛ THE PLAN was as intricate as a piece of Boule cabinet work and as closely jointed. It did not, however, depend essentially upon this jointing but upon the fact that at every moment the immense reserve of force represented by Task Force 58, Mitscher's carriers and the battleships, would be free to meet whatever form of counterattack the enemy chose—that there were now in fact two American fleets, one to hold the sea and one to support the marines across the beaches. Japan had only one; it was probably stronger than the second American fleet, but getting at that fleet and the transports it covered without encountering Task Force 58 demanded something pretty special in the line of deceptive tactics.

To be continued

⁵These hard-working, unsung ships were the heavies *Chester* and *Pensacola*; light cruisers *Detroit* and *Concord*, with *Desron 49*.

Does He Qualify?

☛ "OF COURSE I'M READY FOR THAT PROMOTION! As a matter of fact I think that I've been stagnating for the last two years and they owe this one to me for faithful service during inflation."

There is no doubt that at the present time those words represent the mental processes of any Marine officer who might find himself listed as among those selected for promotion to the next higher rank. The very word "selected" implies that the selectee has been found qualified. That the fortunate officer thus picked for promotion considers himself qualified, no one would dispute. But does Headquarters, Marine Corps, know it? Ah, there's the rub! They don't—not for sure, anyway. And so for peacetime purposes, at least within the memory of many a living Marine officer, the ordeal of promotion examinations was instituted so that Headquarters *could* make sure.

This article proposes to examine, first, the necessity for promotion examinations and, second, the scope of such examinations if they are deemed necessary. It is believed that a couple of examples will serve to set the pace and illustrate why the old pre-war system needs overhauling.

First example:—The scene is San Diego and promotion examinations for the step up to first lieutenant are in progress. (The year is not important—suffice it to say that it was when second lieutenants saluted and said "sir" to first lieutenants.) The writer is a sweating participant in this test. He is currently involved in the "Administration Examination" for which he has been warned by official orders that he is not allowed to use any books or papers but is held responsible for a knowledge of the contents of the Marine Corps Manual, Navy Regulations, Uniform Regulations, Circular Letters, and Marine Corps Orders. He draws from the sealed envelope a slip

asking for a complete exposition on the subject of the regulations regarding payrolls aboard ship. It so happens that this information is contained in a chapter of the Marine Corps Manual which an official letter received prior to the examination had euphemistically stated was to be conned for "general knowledge" only. The struggle continues. Over fifty men (or is that the governing number?) aboard ship for less than ninety days is one thing; under fifty men aboard ship for over fifty (or is it ninety) days is something

else. Or is it vice versa? Or are these the correct figures in the first place? At any rate the answer is hopelessly botched—a complete bust.

Was the writer "qualified" in respect to the preparation of muster rolls at sea? Apparently not—yet, some years later on sea duty where the question came up every month it was a simple matter to refer to the Marine Corps Manual to check the regulations—or rather to check the first sergeant, who had looked it up in the first place before ever sending the payroll in to the "skipper" for signature. The point is that the answer to any question based on regulations contained in a standard text which will always be available to every officer (except on the morning of the promotion examination) is certainly no test of that officer's fitness for promotion. If he knows the answer, what does it prove? Perhaps that he would make a good first sergeant.

As an anticlimax to this episode it might be mentioned that although the answer described above was worth a complete "swabo," it was balanced by the correct answer to this question—a real toughie—"What is the regulation length of an enlisted man's haircut?" Did knowing the answer to this prove fitness to advance one grade? I leave it to the reader.

The examination just referred to was by no

By LtCol Robert E. Cushman, Jr.

Promotion examinations are necessary—not the administrative type, but thorough tests of skill in the practical handling of troops, supplies, and weapons. These examinations should test ability of officers to command in the field, not garrison

means the only one. The list of subjects also included "Strategy and Tactics." Here we get to the meat of the military man's profession. If there was ever a subject about which a Marine officer should know the answers to prove qualified for promotion—this was it. And this leads to the second example. For there was a joker—contained in a footnote which explained that if an officer had completed Basic School or had been an instructor or student at any one of a number of service schools, he was exempt. For example, in this same examination mentioned earlier, the author was exempt from being tested on his knowledge of tactics because he had successfully completed Basic School by means of a correspondence course. On the other hand, a classmate who failed to finish this course within the prescribed time was made to take this test. As far as could be ascertained, he was probably the only Marine officer of his day who had ever taken such a test! Incidentally, it consisted principally of maneuvering a squad or two about in the formations of extended order drill on the parade ground of a Navy Yard.

It can be seen that that examination was more of a punishment than a true test of fitness for promotion. As a matter of fact it should be a *privilege*, not a punishment, to take and pass a real tactics examination and thus qualify for promotion and the next higher command.

This last example illustrates another important point—promotion examinations should test the ability of the individual to command in war time—not to administer a garrison detachment in peacetime.

❁ PERHAPS the immediate reaction to the above examples is that this is a different age—we don't need such promotion examinations now. Don't we have fitness reports and selection boards? The answer is that we do, but the perfect fitness report form and the perfect reporting senior have yet to be devised. However, fitness reports are all that selection boards have available to enable them to make their decisions. It becomes obvious that under this system it is possible for officers who make a career of doing nothing—nothing bad and nothing outstanding—and avoiding controversies, honest expressions of opinion, and the difficult job of making decisions—to be promoted whether they are qualified or not. The able, but outspoken, officer who has perhaps hit the jackpot several times but has also been wrong once or twice and reprimanded,

may be passed over in favor of the officer who has never done anything positive—hence nothing wrong—in his life. It is not claimed that this is occurring, or has occurred—but it *could* happen, which is the important thing. While it is not maintained that proper promotion examinations can entirely correct this possible evil, certainly such examinations of the proper scope can do much to alleviate the situation. A further beneficial effect of such tests would be that it would force each officer selected for promotion to study the given subjects. In fact, this was the principal recommendation for the old type promotion exam—it forced the officers to study administration, Naval law, ordnance, and kindred subjects. But we have grown up now. Officers must be ready, in this fast-moving age, to be always ready for combat and to assume command and staff positions from Battalion up to Corps and even Expeditionary Troops. To face such a prospect officers must be qualified, through the medium of proper promotion examinations, to perform the command and staff duties of their rank, and even of the next higher rank, in combat organizations. This means that such examinations must test the officer's ability to perform these staff and command functions in combat, not his excellence in checking muster rolls in peacetime detachments. And it further shows that such examinations are necessary, else how, in peace, are we ever to know that any particular officer is qualified for these duties?

It is believed for these reasons that promotion examinations are necessary. It remains to examine the subject matter required in order to obtain the objective we have set for such examinations.

It is not proposed here to go into the details of all the various subjects, but rather to explore and state the principles and most important subjects upon which such examination should be based. Perhaps a good point of departure is to repeat a principle given earlier and show what should *not* be included: namely, those subjects of a purely administrative and routine nature whose tenets are a matter of reference and leisurely reflection such as Naval law, administration, ordnance, etc. Examinations in these subjects should normally take place in service schools.

What, then, shall we include? Another principle stated earlier helps us here—the examination should test the ability of the officer concerned to perform staff and command duties in

a combat organization in time of war or battle.

To implement these general statements we need a few concrete subjects. The old "Strategy and Tactics" leaps to the mind. Granting that the Commandant should be a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and thus versed in strategy, it is not suggested that he be given an examination in this subject. However, the Commandant is just about the only Marine officer who does have to be a strategist, and it is submitted that practically all other officers act as part of an attack force in an amphibious operation and hence are required to know tactics, not strategy. It is believed that the most important single examination should be in that subject—tactics—and that there should be *no* exemptions for any cause. The test should be mainly in the field, with troops, and involve some situations requiring decisions, as well as others requiring the application of tactical principles to outlined situations in which the decision is already made and the test is one of execution. Officers not already serving with Fleet Marine Force units could be ordered to the nearest one for this purpose. This test in tactics will thus embrace certain elements of a test in command and leadership as well. In addition, questions concerning staff functioning can be worked into the situation. Thus a comprehensive examination covering tactics, leadership, and staff functioning could be given, both in written form and in practical form in the field. Furthermore (taking our life in our hands), it is believed that examinations, at least in written form should be given for promotion up to the rank of major general. Up to colonel was the limit in the old days but the fact remains that general officers, and general officers only, command our basic unit of combined arms—the Marine Division—and promotion examinations should cover this fact.

For the above reasons it is believed that the principal examinations should be in tactics, and command and staff functioning, embracing requirements demanding both field and classroom work.

☛ THESE subjects are important. Equally important is leadership. Can ability to lead be determined by examination? Other than the examination of war itself, the answer must be no. Failures in leadership stem from a lack of moral or physical courage, not from ignorance of the principles which are clearly expressed in many books and manuals. It is believed that qualifica-

tion in this field must be left to the fitness report and to the secondary results of the field examination in tactics described above.

☛ SO FAR we have only two principal subjects to offer: tactics, and command and staff functioning. However, these two subjects alone will permit examinations of almost any length and scope desired. Offensive tactics, defensive tactics, amphibious operations, training, motor movements, security, shore party—the list is endless and these are but a few of the detailed subjects which might be used and with which every officer should be familiar to be qualified for promotion. In addition, if it is considered that there is merit in testing the proficiency of officers in certain subjects in which a working everyday knowledge is required, even though there may be few specific applications of these routine subjects in combat, such examinations could be included. The suggestion in this case is to use such as are deemed desirable but to pattern the examination after the old probationary examinations—namely, to provide the references to the officer during the test and to place the emphasis on the *time* required to find the correct answers in that reference. Thus no premium is placed upon ability to memorize such texts as the Marine Corps Manual—a futile task at best, but one which was formerly required of all aspiring applicants for the next higher rank.

To arrive at the best solution to the problem of ascertaining the fitness of selected officers for promotion, it is submitted that the weight of any professional examination must be on the tactical side, not the administrative side, and that these tests must be stringent, with failure to advance, not reexamination, the penalty for not passing the examination. (In connection with the above it should be noted that "tactics" should be construed to include problems of logistics, personnel, etc., and is not to be given its narrow school-book definition.)

This is the day of a Marine Corps prepared to operate in terms of divisions—not "jury-rig" detachments. We must have officers who measure up to the new standards. There is no room in this Marine Corps for deadwood. An adequate and comprehensive, yet realistic, system of promotion examinations will help to furnish a young, alert, professionally qualified officer group attuned to operate in the outfit that is "First to Fight."

US ☛ MC

Devil Birds



Blood And Hell Jelly At Peleliu

✚ AFTER THE MARIANAS' CAMPAIGNS, THE ALLIED offensive swung south and west. It was directed against western islands of the Carolines—the Palau group—which command the approaches to the Philippines from the east and New Guinea from the north. 1,000 miles west

of Truk and only 530 miles from Davao in the Philippines, the Palaus are a chain 20 miles wide and 77 miles long. Principal invasion target in this enemy mandate possession was the small roughly terrained and wooded island of Peleliu in the southern Palaus. Its capture would point the Allied spearheads which had been driving up from the South Pacific and west through the Central Pacific.

1st Division marines drove across coral reefs and on to the western beaches of Peleliu under fierce Japanese fire on September 15. They repelled several heavy counterattacks during the afternoon of the first day and by night were generally pinned down near the beaches. At dawn of the second day, the marines began cleaning out enemy caves and pillboxes using flamethrowers, bazookas, mortars, and tanks. Veteran Japanese troops continued to counterattack during the day, but the airfield was taken by dusk.

Ground echelons of the Second Marine Air Wing started ashore to build an air camp, but were pressed immediately into the beachhead operations. One hour after the assault waves went ashore, the air marines were forming boat platoons for unloading, beaching, and evacuation of wounded among the infantry. One week later, aviation personnel were still serving as frontline stretcher bearers and ammunition handlers after fighting as riflemen and grenade throwers. Six

were killed and 11 wounded during this period of unusual "air support." Grasshoppers of VMO 3 landed on a 550 foot field on D-plus-2 to initiate their artillery observation and scouting missions.

Peleliu's air base opened for traffic on September 24, Marine Commando transports navigating for eight planes

of VMF (N) 542 and carrying MajGen James T. Moore were the first

to land. Moore set up headquarters for the Second Wing and its one Air Group and as Commander, Garrison Air Forces, Western Carolines. His area command was charged with three major tasks: (1) Air defense of all American ground troops and convoys in the Western Carolines; (2) Furnishing air support for the ground forces on Peleliu, Ngesebus, and other islands in vicinity; and (3) Neutralization of the remaining enemy bases in the Western Carolines. By the end of September, one Corsair fighter squadron (VMF 114) and half a night-fighter unit were operating and the ground crews of three other squadrons were standing by for the arrival of their planes and pilots.

A battalion of the 5th Marines, supported by Sherman tanks, crossed the coral reef along the northern coast of Peleliu on September 28 and landed at Ngesebus Island under cover of VMF 114, which bombed and later strafed the beaches for thirty minutes, until the infantry units were within 200 yards of shore.* The island's air base was captured by noon, and by nightfall all enemy resistance except a small pocket was eliminated. The marines also captured two small nearby islands. With the exception of the menacing Bloody Nose Ridge area, all organized resistance on Peleliu ended September 29.

*See *The Closer the Better* by LtCol Lewis W. Walt in the September, 1946, GAZETTE.

By Capt John DeChant

Part VI: Flying the shortest bombing hop in the Pacific, Corsairs of the Death Dealers Squadron bomb Bloody Nose Ridge on Peleliu. The Fourth Wing transports 6,000,000 pounds of freight without mishap; antishipping strikes made near Japan

Corsairs of the Death Dealers squadron made their first close air support mission against Bloody Nose Ridge on the morning of September 29 and continued these strikes regularly for two months with "extreme accuracy." They dumped their bombs on a small horseshoe curve in the Death Valley sector just fifteen seconds after passing over the ready tent on the airfield where they had been briefed. Ankle-deep in mud, the rain-soaked ground crewmen of the squadron watched the first of what came to be known as one of the shortest bombing hops in the Pacific war.

✿ MAJ ROBERT F. STOUT, Guadalcanal ace and squadron commander, led the planes which plastered the target area on the first raid. Bomb concussions on the ridge shook the airfield and rocked its control tower while one pilot slipped his bomb into the mouth of one of the large enemy caves, sealing it up permanently.

Until the defenders were wiped out on November 27, the Marine fighter-bomber squadrons, now including VMFs 121 and 122, pounded away at the Peleliu pocket. Early in October, the F4Us began fire bomb raids. The Napalm "hell jelly" ironically, was mixed with captured Japanese gasoline stores.

Making their runs with wheels down at extremely low altitude and close to friendly troops, the Corsairs were able to sear off the brush concealing enemy emplacements and suffocate or burn to death many of the cave-entrenched Japanese. Their early efforts were so successful that the F4Us continued to make these "flying flame-thrower" attacks during the remainder of the mopping up campaign.

Living within concussion blast of mortar and heavy artillery positions and under the low roof of steel they belched up at the Ridge, the Second Wing units continued their backyard air support for the troops of the 81st Army Division which had taken over from the 1st Division in mid-October and had contributed a combat team during the early Peleliu phases. Corsairs also provided air cover for infantry units landing at Pulo Anna island, 200 miles southwest of Peleliu,

November 4, and for a further infantry landing at Ngregong Island.

Long before the last Japanese died in his cave on Bloody Nose Ridge, Gen Moore's squadrons were concentrating on what was by then an old Marine tradition—the milk runs. His GAF, Western Carolines, included eleven squadrons, both Army and Marine, and two Air Groups.

Beyond the enemy base at Yap were the islands of Ulithi Atoll, site of the second air base of Moore's command. The Ulithi invasion, a phase of the Peleliu operation, was ordered because Ulithi's large lagoon was to be used as the major fleet anchorage for the impending invasion of the Philippines. Its main island of Faleolap was taken without opposition by Army infantry on September 23. The first elements of MAG 45 arrived there on October 8 and its night fighter planes were patrolling the area by the end of the month.

✿ THE AIR GROUP entered its phase of the bypassed islands campaign when planes of VMTB 232 made their first run over Yap November 2. During four months on Ulithi, the TBM Avenger bombers of this twenty-year old squadron carried out a relentless campaign against Western Caroline bases—Yap, Fais, Sorol, and Woleai. Secondly, it conducted a ceaseless antisubmarine patrol over the Fleet anchorage in the Ulithi lagoon. Two of its planes were credited with sinking an enemy submarine during a hunter-killer mission on November 20 against a reported wolf-pack of enemy subs.

Back at Peleliu, planes of Moore's GAF struck in a new direction when Army B-24s based at nearby Angaur Island bombed Japanese fields on Luzon in the Philippines. The Liberators flew daily strikes thereafter against Philippine installations with alternate targets in the northern Palaus which were receiving the brunt of Marine raids. In early December, air operations against the enemy-held Palaus had reached the milk-run stage.

Garrison Air Force, Western Carolines, was disbanded then and its Army and Navy personnel returned to other duties. On December 15,

the Second Wing, consisting only of a headquarters squadron, was returned to Pearl Harbor for the planning stages of the Okinawa invasion. Marine Air Groups 11 and 45, with their six squadrons, were transferred to the Fourth Air Wing.

Through the final weeks of 1944, until the end of the war, the Peleliu squadrons kept thousands of Japanese troops pinned down to their bases while carrying out a systematic campaign of destruction against them. The main targets were Babelthuap, largest island in the Palaus, and Yap. During five weeks of milk run raids, the Corsair squadrons at Peleliu flew 1,100 sorties, dropping 186 tons of bombs on predetermined targets. The pinpoint bomb drops in this period netted a variety of destruction—112 barges, 58 trucks, 35 assorted oil, supply, and ammunition dumps, 1 dam, 2 radio stations, 10 power boats, 4 boat houses, 2 whale boats, 1 locomotive, 12 warehouses, 20 small motor boats, one eighty foot ship, one one-hundred foot ship, 3 piers, 3 planes on the ground and one in the air, along with undetermined, but considerable, personnel damage.

Peleliu airfield was designated as a Marine Corps air base in January and put under command of Col Karl S. Day, a World War I flier. Marine airmen served as Island Commander. Peleliu, a position which was held successively by BrigGens Harold D. Campbell, Christian F. Schilt, and Ford O. Rogers, from the assault until after the Japanese capitulation.

Aerial Lifeline To Everywhere

✿ WITH THE WESTERN CAROLINAS ON ITS ROSTER, Woods' Fourth Wing was operating over an ocean area of more than 2,000,000 square miles from its seven major bases in the Marshalls, Marianas, Palaus, and Ulithi. Knitting this vast network of Marine activity into a compact and effective whole and linking it to other theaters of war was an aerial lifeline to everywhere—the twin-engined transport squadrons which hauled tactical air traffic over the Pacific reaches.

This Central Pacific counterpart of SCAT—the infantry's combat airline in the Solomons—made what is considered the most significant contribution of the Marine Air Arm to continued front-line infantry support during the mid-Pacific campaigning. Like SCAT, the several Central Pacific transport organizations were a remarkable example of interservice cooperation, with Army, Navy, and Marine personnel operating

jointly in all the major units. As in the South Pacific, Marine transport squadrons were the core and bulk of these airlines with Army planes in strong support.

First of this series of Central Pacific transport units which telescoped one into another was the Samoan Combat Air Transport Service, which began operations at Tutuila in September, 1943. Commanded by Maj Edmund L. Zonne, former civilian airline pilot, this service had one squadron—VMJ 353—flying Douglas R4Ds and serving the garrison forces in the Samoan area.

CENCATS, the Central Pacific Combat Air Transport Service, was activated under Gen Merritt's Fourth Wing in mid-November of the same year to handle air traffic from its headquarters at Tutuila over the small island network of Upolo, Wallis, Funafuti, Nukufetau, and Nanomea.

✿ AS THE INVASION FORCES drove upward into the Gilberts, the air transports hovered in their wake. The first large plane to land at Tarawa was a CENCATS freighter, which brought to the island's first radio transmitter and personnel to operate it. Next day one of its transport planes flew in Adm Nimitz and other high-ranking service personnel for an inspection tour of the atoll battlefield. Both flights and succeeding trips into Tarawa brought out plane loads of wounded.

CENCATS planes flew an exhausting round-the-clock shuttle during the month of December when its command was taken over by Marine LtCol Thomas J. McQuade with an Army major as its executive officer. Ground crews worked on a 24-hour schedule to keep the transports operational for the emergency flights to and from the captured bases in the Gilberts.*

Bulldozers barely leveled portions of the captured air bases after the Marshall invasions in February, when CENCATS flights pancaked on one after another of the fields after pioneering hops over hundreds of miles of open water, weaving in and out between enemy-held islands to find the tiny atoll strips. They opened makeshift air terminals and began scheduled operations from the new fields under conditions that would have caused shudders in commercial airlines. One Marine plane even squeezed in a landing on the half-finished field at Eniwetok to

*Opening new terminals on their first flights into Makin and Apamama, the planes of the Marine squadron and three Army transports carried 2,229 passengers, 535,000 pounds of priority freight, 206,000 pounds of regular mail, and 500 pounds of top priority messenger mail during the month.



Corsairs drop hell jelly (napalm) on Peleliu ridge. Japanese holed up in caves were difficult to extricate—floods of searing napalm burn away concealment.

bring in heavy construction gear needed to surface the strip.

Aerial cargoes into the combat zones were made up of priority passengers, mail, medical supplies, and the odds and ends of war needed to maintain the garrison forces and expedite the aerial siege campaign. One emergency flight brought in 6,000 pounds of soap because the filthy clothing of the troops ashore was infecting their battle wounds. At Roi, the infantry was suffering from a dietary deficiency and 10,000 pounds of canned tomato juice winged its way in to relieve the condition. Planes returning to bases in the south of east to Pearl Harbor loaded out with regular cargoes of medical patients, mail, and passengers. During one urgent transfer of a Marine Air Group, 438 officers and men and 71,700 pounds of gear were hauled in eight days by six planes.

To meet new demands on its services, CENCATS was reorganized as the Transport Air Group (TAG) during March and two new squadrons were added. Marine Utility Squadron 252 flying the high-speed, whale-bellied R5C Curtiss

Commando transports joined on the first of March and the Army's 10th Troop Carrier unit one month later. The new Commandos gave additional impetus and range to the tactical airlines because of their advantages over the traditional Douglas R4Ds in speed, capacity, and distance.

Prowling the sky highways of the Pacific under the ambitious title of the Victory Air Line, with large white shipping tags painted under the noses of its transports, TAG planes made 545 flights during April. By month's end, the freight squadrons had been in operation for half a year and their records showed not a single serious accident in hauling 15,200 passengers, 3,380,000 pounds of freight, and 2,386,000 pounds of mail on its atoll runs. The squadrons were then hauling an average of two and one half million pounds of cargo a month, and that total rose steadily.

TAG transports operating under the Fourth Wing entered their biggest phase of combat air support during the invasions of the Marianas. At Saipan, Guam, and Tinian, the twin-engined

planes were the first large planes to land on the captured fields. During the battle for Saipan, the transports rushed 48,000 pounds of urgently needed supplies to the battlefield from Kwajalein, more than twelve hundred miles away and they returned with heavy loads of wounded infantrymen. In two weeks, at the height of the campaign, the TAG terminal at Saipan handled nearly five thousand passengers and one and one half million pounds of air freight. One of its R4Ds was specially fitted out to spray DDT over island camps to combat a rising epidemic of dengue fever. Another pilot was cited for saving his load of medical patients in an emergency landing by using parachutes rigged to the plane to stop it before it crashed beyond the end of the runway. In four and one-half days of the Tinian battle, the aerial ambulance hauled out 1,400 battle casualties to rear bases hospitals and established a new Pacific evacuation record.

✿ THE MARINE TRANSPORT PLANES performed another spectacular air support mission in the early days of the Peleliu campaign when the combat troops were without food and their field hospitals, still under fire, were crowded far beyond capacity with scores of battle casualties. The transports at Saipan made their emergency run when foul weather and surf conditions made supply and evacuation by small boat impossible.

All available planes of VMR 952 were stripped of their original cargoes and jammed with rations. At dawn, sixteen TAG Commandos headed for Peleliu in one of the largest emergency air operations of the Central Pacific war. Flying unarmed and unescorted over miles of enemy-held territory, the planes landed safely. After an overnight stop under sniper fire, the transports loaded dozens of emergency patients on hurriedly-rigged stretchers and litters and made the stormy 900-mile return trip without incident.

October 9, TAG was moved forward from the Marshalls to the Marianas where it set up headquarters at Agana field, Guam. Two units, VMR 253 and 952, handled the forward traffic while the two other Marine squadrons—VMRs 252 and 353—remained as the mainstays of ATG, the Air Transport Group, flying the local runs in the Gilberts and Marshalls.*

*When ATG disbanded in March 1945, its Marine squadrons were moved up to operate with TAG. During the last year of the war, the forward-area Marine transports were assisted by TAU, a special transport line handling "hot cargo" which operated out of MCAS, Ewa, under the Third Marine Air Wing. This squadron—VMR 853—operated over the entire Pacific Theater and by July, 1945, had flown its 25 millionth passenger mile without incident or accident.

The land-based twin-engined transports of TAG and the other Marine transport units continued to wing out day and night over thousands of miles of ocean on their runs from atoll to island in the Central and South Pacific, serving the Marine and Army divisions, the naval bases, and the Marine air units. Special hops took them to Samoa, Australia, the Philippines, and the Admiralties as they toted strange combinations of VIPs (Very Important Personages), Jap prisoners, USO performers, penicillin, Marine war dogs, blood plasma, and war plans. Their performance over the ocean areas without the loss of a single passenger or a serious accident in 23 months and 14,191,000 miles of air travel was tactically spectacular in its routine, undramatic fashion.

Next way station of the TAG planes took them half way up to Tokyo on a bearing north by west from Saipan.

"Eight Square Miles Of Hell"

✿ DURING THE FIRST DAYS OF 1945, THE WORD was spread deliberately through the bistros of Honolulu that the next American offensive would be against Formosa, the Beautiful Island, called Taiwan by the Japanese. Instead, in the dawn of February 19, the eight hundred ship invasion armada of the Fifth Fleet stood off an inconspicuous little island of the Volcano group in the Kazan Retto.

It was Iwo Jima. Precisely at three minutes after nine o'clock, the first assault wave pawed its way up the black volcanic sands of this "eight square miles of hell." These were the first of the 61,000 marines of the V Amphibious Corps composed largely of the 3d, 4th, and 5th Marine Divisions who were committed to action against the 22,000 Japanese hidden in Iwo's earth and rock defenses.

Prior to the landing, an unparalleled naval and air bombardment had turned the island into what was described as a "pork chop with a bump, frying and sizzling in the ocean."

Ashore, the marines fought up the heights of Mount Suribachi, planted the flag, and then pressed their relentless assault on the central and northern parts of the island and the three airfields. At the end of thirty-six savage days, and at the price of 5,500 Marine dead, Iwo Jima was taken. LtGen H. M. Smith, commander of the expeditionary troops, marked down Iwo as "the toughest we've run across in 168 years

of Marine Corps history." Adm Nimitz described it as a battle in which "uncommon valor was a common virtue."

The strategic value of Iwo Jima, some six hundred miles from Tokyo, again highlighted the fact that the Pacific conflict was basically a war for airfields. As a forward fighter base screening the Marianas, Iwo made possible vital over-the-target fighter cover and heavier bomb loads for the B-29 Superfortresses hitting targets in Japan from bases in the Marianas. Its price in Marine lives was staggering, but the investment paid off twice a life for a life, as hundreds of crippled B-29s and their Army crews used Iwo as an emergency haven when they were unable to return to their home fields.

☛ MARINE AIR SUPPORT of the Iwo operation began with the fighter-bomber missions during the landing phase by the Corsair squadrons aboard the fast carriers *Essex* and *Bennington*. First planes to land on the island at Motoyama Field No. 1 were two OY-1s of VMO 4 from the carrier *Wake Island*, on February 26. Their artillery-spotting missions began immediately, with more Grasshoppers of that unit and VMO 5 landing the following day. Two planes and one pilot of Lt Frank S. Rozga's VMO 4 were lost when the carrier *Bismarck Sea* was sunk by a suicide plane. Other planes of Rozga's squadron were launched by special gear from a new type "baby carrier"—the LST 776—fitted with a flight deck. As usual, the Sentinel observation planes were holed and torn by enemy ground fire during their 19 days of operation for the Marine artillery concentrations. Two planes hovered on station from dawn to dusk over Iwo and the six planes of VMO 4 managed 194 combat flights with only one pilot wounded.

Up from Saipan on March 1 came the first air support plane of TAG. The Commando made five low passes over Motoyama, one dropping 4,400 pounds of mail by parapak to the front-line troops. Two days later, another R5C nosed up to Iwo and landed on a portion of the field to unload 5,500 pounds of badly needed mortar ammunition. Again, on March 4, a TAG emergency mission, flown by planes of VMR 952, swept in over Iwo and para-dropped 51,000 pounds of mortar shells from their nine planes. Seventy-nine flights into Iwo were made by planes of VMR 952 during March on priority missions. Return flights evacuated 625 wounded infantrymen.

The third phase of air arm combat at Iwo was the operation of VMTB 242 which landed its first planes there March 8. Eighteen more of its type TBM-3 Avengers were ferried in from Tinian the next day to begin inshore antisubmarine patrols on a twenty-four hour basis. Eighteen pilots ranged out over the day sectors and 24 flew the night sea patrols on a rugged schedule in which the squadron flew 3,300 combat hours in the first month at Iwo.

Night marauding PBJ bombers, commanded by LtCol "Mad Jack" Cram, who won the Navy Cross at Guadalcanal, landed at Iwo on April 6 to put Marine land-based planes within range of the Japanese homeland for the first time. Cram, who had been experimenting with fast night-search radar bombers since the summer of 1943, stripped his Mitchells of all armament except tail guns to make weight and room for special radar gear, additional gas tanks, and eight 5-inch rockets slung on the wings.

Four days after arriving, a PBJ of VMB 612 made the first night run to Japan and severely damaged a cargo ship near the naval base at Kobe. Then, joining the neutralization campaign for the Okinawa operation, planes of the squadron on April 16 made rocket attacks on airfields in southern Kyushu, Japan with Army P-51s as fighter escorts.

☛ THROUGHOUT May and June, Cram led his squadron on a relentless series of long-range antishipping searches along the southern coast of Japan, with some of the missions more than fifteen hundred miles in length. In late May and June, the PBJs experimented extensively with "Tiny Tims"—new 11.75-inch rockets which had the fire blast of an artillery broadside. Twenty-three attacks were made on enemy ships in June during the 74 low-altitude missions flown by the squadron along the coastal and inland waters of the Empire. Cram's pilots, despite weather and enemy night fighters, sank one ship and damaged 16 others during the period to bring the VMB 612 score to 5 Jap ships sunk and 53 damaged.

During the summer, VMB 612 moved to Okinawa and Iwo Jima settled back into the routine of rear-area existence as a dismal, unfriendly, well-blooded monument to valor, and another air terminal for TAG's transports droning northwest toward Japan.

To be continued

Marine Corps Schools

—Up To Date

✻ IN THE APRIL ISSUE OF THE GAZETTE, Maj John J. Wade, Jr., asks the question, "Are Service Schools Up To Date?" I know little about present day Army and Navy schools, but I should like to answer Maj Wade's query, as far as it applies to the Marine Corps Schools, with emphasis where he places it—on the instructors.

Maj Wade would commission "graduates of civilian colleges and universities holding education degrees." To quote him further, "Upon being commissioned they would receive thorough training in military science, tactics and technique, first in basic, then in specialist fields." Passing over the fact that they would receive this training from plain soldiers—not from graduate professors—one wonders how long a period of time Maj Wade would allow for this "thorough training." How many senior officers does he know whom he considers to have received a thorough training? How many officers of twenty or thirty years' service does he know, who, themselves, consider that they are completely trained?

A man may spend a lifetime studying strategy and tactics, troop training and troop leading from text books, but he has to apply the general guides, which are all that these books profess to set forth, before he can ever hope to become a tactician, strategist, or troop leader—before he can adequately interpret these books and impart his knowledge to others. These subjects cannot be taught from a text book like Spanish, English, physics, geometry, or history. There are no rules of grammar or inviolable mathematical dogma upon which to base military instruction. There are only broad military principles upon which to start. Application of these principles to actual practice, in war or in maneuvers, is essential to a complete and thorough understanding of them. Without such an understanding, they can not be successfully taught. Any experienced officer can vouch for the wide divergence between his pre-battle and his post-battle concepts of military tactics.

Such things must be taught by men who have

worked them out in the field—who have learned their correct application and their limitations. The advance from the Greek phalanx to modern battle formations was not the result of the teachings of professors. Soldiers learned their lessons the hard way—by getting hurt. Experience, plus imagination and ingenuity, has been responsible for every improvement in the art of war. Even the modernization of weapons, with its inevitable effect upon tactics, must be attributed to battle experience. The inventors and manufacturers themselves have frequently

been civilians but the motivating thought has almost invariably come from a military man who has been faced with a critical problem in the field.

Maj Wade, speaking of "many of the nations' most eminent instructors," says, "Their achievements in education have resulted not so much from technical knowledge of a particular field as from their inherent talent for teaching." It might also be observed that at least as many graduate teachers have failed, through lack of this inherent quality, to become anything more than faces behind books. We have all suffered under them.

Granted that a course in education is of inestimable value to one who has this inherent quality. But it can never make a good teacher of one who lacks that quality.

Granted, further, that this inherent talent for teaching is an altogether desirable attribute for instructors to possess. But no amount of such talent can replace the practical knowledge of the capabilities and limitations of men and equipment under varying conditions of terrain, climate, and weather. Upon these capabilities and limitations, all tactics must be based. Upon an officer's knowledge of them will success or failure depend. If I must get such knowledge from someone else I prefer to get it from an officer who has "been there"—not from one who has read a lot of books and then wants to teach me what the books say. Unless he has led troops, how can anyone be qualified to teach troop lead-

By Col Donald Spicer

Technical knowledge from a manual is helpful, but a man cannot teach tactics and logistics correctly and thoroughly without actually having employed his theories in combat. Logistics on the beach and in the classroom are two different things

ing? One year of duty on a staff, without command responsibility, won't make a troop leader.

For most of us a lifetime is required to gain adequate experience in military science. To the great majority of us, mature judgment and the ability to focus upon the important aspects of a tactical situation, in spite of battle noises and all other disconcerting and misleading factors, comes only after twenty or thirty years of study, training, and experience.

If these graduates of teachers' colleges can receive such a thorough training in military science, tactics, and technique that they are qualified to get up and teach combat veterans, then we must have been wasting an awful lot of time training battalion, regimental, and division commanders in the past. Why not skip most of the twenty to thirty years of training, and put the "professors" in command? Then we could get generals at the age of 25 who would last us for many years.

I doubt very much that a man without engineering experience can successfully teach engineering; that anyone can learn carpentry from a book and then teach a youngster how to use his tools. The same applies to chemistry, electronics, and many other subjects.

Anyone can stand up and expound the theory of logistics from a manual. Time and space tables and march graphs can be compiled at a desk. A mathematician can figure how many APAs and AKAs will be required to lift a division for an amphibious operation 2,000 miles from home. What he cannot teach, without actual experience, is how well his tables will stand up in practice. Unless he has been on the beach, under fire, with a shore party, he cannot visualize the actual functioning of logistics. Only then can he gain first hand, practical knowledge of the hundreds of small, unforeseeable things which can throw the beach into a chaos of uncoordinated activity.

Before the recent war, logistics was taught, necessarily, by instructors with little actual experience. The present day instruction by officers who have served with shore parties in combat,

or as G-4s, or TQMs, is strikingly different. The logistics which I learned at the Marine Corps Schools in 1940 bears only a slight resemblance to the course in the Amphibious Warfare School of 1946-47.

As for the statement that our instructors are detailed largely on the basis of current availability, I do not believe that it is accurate. During the postwar readjustment it has undoubtedly been necessary, on occasion, to "pull an officer out of the hat" and assign him to duty as an instructor. But I know that strenuous efforts are constantly being made to fill all billets with qualified instructors. Some of these men make good instructors, while others, though possessing a knowledge of the subject, turn out poorly. Does any one know of a single civilian college where all of the professors have that "inherent talent for teaching?"

Judging by the Senior Course of the Amphibious Warfare School, it is my considered opinion that the level of teaching ability is higher than that found in the average civilian college. In support of this opinion it may be pointed out that many professional men who have been unsuccessful in the field have fallen back upon teaching as a livelihood. Officers who have failed as combat leaders are not assigned to instructional duties in our schools. I feel quite certain that the level in our schools is far above what it would be if we employed part-time "professor-soldiers" as instructors.

There were no professors to teach us amphibious operations. We experimented. We learned by trial and error. After more than twenty years of this we entered World War II with certain concepts. Weaknesses developed in combat. We made corrections. By the time we reached Okinawa we had the best system the world has ever seen. Is a 25-year-old "thoroughly trained" "professor-soldier" now going to teach that system to young officers? God forbid!

What we want is instruction by men who have been through this racket—and who, at the same time, possess that "inherent talent for teaching." The Marine Corps is full of them! US ♣ MC

With the Reserves

6th Infantry Battalion, USMCR

6th Infantry Battalion
MB No. 2, U. S. Naval Base
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
LtCol C. H. Cox, USMCR, Commanding

By 1stLt Marshall M. Austin, USMCR

THE STORY OF THE MARINE CORPS RESERVE in Philadelphia is not only a "Philadelphia Story," but almost exactly the story of several Philadelphians who have remained active in the Marine Reserve virtually since the organization of the unit in 1926.

At that time there were only the 305th and 309th Reserve Companies. Less than a year after the activation of these companies Charles Cox enlisted as a private in the 305th Company. Cox saw the unit grow to the 3d Battalion, 19th Reserve Marines, and he grew with it, being commissioned a second lieutenant in April of 1929. About this time William J. Ryan and Jack Steele enlisted in the reserve as privates and were assigned to M Company, 3d Battalion, which was Lt Cox's company. Later, when the Philadelphia Reserve was changed to the 6th Infantry Battalion, USMCR, John Kerr joined up as a private. In June of 1940 Lt Cox volunteered to go on active duty and in September of the same year the 6th Battalion was called up. Shortly thereafter the battalion was disbanded as its personnel was ordered to regular units. The war took these men to the usual Marine posts and all the areas of fighting in World War II. Lt Cox rose to the rank of lieutenant colonel and served in both theaters and on the staff of Adm

Halsey in the Pacific. Lt Ryan rose to major. Kerr to warrant officer, and Steele to master sergeant before going back to civilian life.

Today these men are the nucleus around which was formed the new 6th Infantry Battalion, USMCR. LtCol Charles Cox, commanding officer; Maj William J. Ryan, executive officer; WO John Kerr, quartermaster, and MSgt Steele, sergeant major.

The Monday night activities of the battalion have been increasing weekly as a steady flow of recruits slowly edge the unit toward authorized strength. Capt Cook, operations officer, has arranged an adequate and interesting series of lectures, demonstrations, and drill periods designed to give the Marine "know how" to the new recruits, the majority of whom have had no previous military training. This program of instruction starts each Monday evening at eight and lasts until ten. By making full use of this time for instruction, the battalion expects to have all the recruits well grounded in fundamentals by the time the unit departs to summer camp for the latter two weeks of August.

The Philadelphia Reserve has been faced with the usual difficulties of a newly organized unit: shortages of time, recruits, and lack of some materiel. However, each week it grows a little and expands instruction, and by the time camp rolls around they will have a battalion worthy of representing the city that gave America the Marine Corps.

11th Engineer Battalion, USMCR

11th Engineer Battalion, USMCR
Fort McHenry
Baltimore 30, Maryland
LtCol T. E. Drummond, USMCR, Commanding

THE 11TH ENGINEER BATTALION, USMCR, was activated on 22 November 1946, at historic Fort McHenry, Baltimore, Maryland. The location of the battalion is of special interest as in many ways it is similar to another unit which was stationed at the fort more than a century ago.

In 1815, a Commodore Barney suggested that an organization called the "Sea Fencibles," which

This is the second of new series in the GAZETTE designed to acquaint the regulars with what the reserves are doing. All organized reserve units are requested to forward news letters and photographs as often as the activities of their organization warrants.

had participated in the defense of Fort McHenry in the War of 1812, he used to raise the ships sunk in the harbor since they were "composed of practical officers, gunners, and seamen and were engaged to serve upon land or water as required." This description rather aptly describes the newly activated battalion now at Fort McHenry. Incidentally, this is the first Marine Reserve battalion ever to have been formed in the state of Maryland.

Tables of organization for the 11th Engineer Battalion provide for a headquarters company and three letter companies, with a total battalion strength of 37 officers and 653 enlisted men. LtCol Theodore E. Drummond, USMCR, is commanding officer of the battalion and LtCol Thomas F. Riley, USMC, is the inspector-instructor. The headquarters company and the three letter companies have been activated and are carrying out a basic training schedule.

Enlistments have been mounting rapidly in recent weeks and enthusiasm is obviously rising. It has been found that one recruit brings in a number of others, if not at the same time, then at a later date. Unusual interest has been shown in the recruiting campaign by 17 and 18 year olds.

All the radio stations in Baltimore have been responsive to the needs of the battalion and local newspapers have been cooperative in giving publicity to its activities. Already the battalion has been granted three 15-minute broadcasts on stations WBAL and WITH. In addition, other stations have given the battalion numerous "spots" on the air. The Baltimore Transit Company has agreed to place recruiting cards on its street cars and busses during the two-week period in June when an intensive drive will be made to obtain the maximum number of recruits. Attractive cards in color, drawing attention to the battalion and the advantages it offers recruits, have been distributed widely throughout the Baltimore area and may be seen in shop windows and other conspicuous places.

The battalion participated in the Army Day parade on the 10th of April in Baltimore and received many favorable comments from civic leaders and high ranking officers of the various services who were present. Five personnel and cargo carriers pulling engineer combat equipment were in the parade.

All commanding and staff officers and the majority of company officers in the battalion served in the Pacific during World War II. LtCol

Drummond, a native son of Baltimore, commanded the 1st Marine Engineer Battalion during the Okinawa campaign and received the Bronze Star for meritorious achievement. He also was at Peleliu and subsequently was decorated with the Order of the Cloud and Banner by the Chinese government. Capt William S. Covington, now commanding Company A, served overseas with Marine Scout Bombing Squadron 343 as an airborne radio-radar officer. Capt Thomas R. Taylor, commanding Company B, did duty overseas with the 3d Marines in Samoa, New Zealand, and in the Solomons as a rifle platoon leader. Capt Laurence B. Naylor III, commanding C Company, served with the Second Air Wing as a communications officer in the Marshalls and on Okinawa. 1stLt Alexander L. Michau, Jr., commanding officer of Headquarters Company, was wounded while with the 1st Marine Division at Okinawa.

Training of the battalion includes all basic military subjects and particular features of Marine Corps military engineering. In the recruiting campaign, however, it has been emphasized that lack of previous engineering experience is not a bar to joining the battalion. This has been an excellent inducement for former servicemen to bring with them the varied experiences and qualifications which will be an asset to the battalion. The first summer training period will be held at Camp Lejeune, N. C., from 9 August to 23 August.

Fighter Squadron 121, USMCR

VMF 121, MAD, NAS
Glenview, Illinois

Maj R. S. Ingram, USMCR, Commanding

✱ SINCE THE FIRST ORGANIZATIONAL MEETINGS in July 1946, VMF 121 has been building toward a reserve status comparable to the outstanding combat record established by the squadron during the war.

Regular drills under Commanding Officer Maj Robert S. Ingram have been conducted twice monthly since the formal commissioning of the squadron as a unit of the Marine Air Reserve Training Command. A system of drills has been devised which affords all pilots an opportunity to meet the flight requirements of the training syllabus, in spite of periodic limited aircraft available. The squadron is divided into two wings, and drills are held on the second and fourth weekend of each month, one wing reporting on Saturday of the "drill weekend" and the

other reporting Sunday. This system also affords personnel a choice in drill dates, which has especially been an aid in attracting enlisted men. Periodic meetings of the entire squadron as a group are held so that close touch is maintained with all squadron members. A thorough training syllabus, which includes both ground and flight training involving the use of fighter type aircraft, is being followed.

Instruction in basic Marine Corps subjects is regularly carried on for officers and enlisted personnel. In addition, special classes of instruction are currently being held for new recruits who have had no prior military training. This group includes the so-called "teen agers" between the ages of 17 and 18½ who have recently become eligible for duty with the squadron. Ground officers attached to the squadron are especially well qualified as instructors in both technical aviation matters and Marine Corps subjects.

All the squadron's disposal at Naval Air Station, Glenview, is the Naval Air Technical Air School which affords the facilities needed for instruction in all technical aviation subjects.

Maintenance and servicing of aircraft is now handled almost completely by the squadron on drill days. Routine service checks are performed by the station personnel, but the efforts of mechanics and ground crews attached to the squadron have materially affected the availability of aircraft—for the better.

Flight and ground training has progressed favorably to date. At this writing flight operations now being conducted involve fixed gunnery runs, which is an advanced stage in the syllabus. A flying area has been assigned over Lake Michigan, north of Chicago and south of Milwaukee, which affords an excellent area for such maneuvers.

The squadron is scheduled to report for an active duty training period some time in the early fall. During this period every effort will be made to complete the syllabus requirements which are tentatively set up on an annual basis. In the meantime, in addition to our regularly scheduled drills, many pilots are able to report for flights between drill dates and thereby build up flight time which is so necessary to maintain efficiency. Several members of the squadron have chosen to report for an optional 15-day active duty training period before the fiscal year 1947 closes. During the last two months many of the squadron members have taken their active duty training period at Glenview.

VMF 121 is particularly fortunate in having the aid and advice of LtCol Leonard K. Davis, former commanding officer of the squadron in the regular service. Col Davis is now commanding officers of the Marine Air Detachment, NAS, Glenview.

Pilots and enlisted men of the squadron that accounted for 209 Jap planes and sunk 2 Jap destroyers during the war, are showing widely varied activities in civilian life. Occupations listed in the records include structural drafting, photography, railroading, electrical engineering, veterinary surgery, television, farming, insurance, sales managing, civil service, optometry, music, and many others as well as college and technical courses being followed by many of the younger officers and enlisted men. One man in the squadron is attending Northwestern University in nearby Evanston, Illinois, and owns a 500-acre farm in Kansas. Some idea of the variance in background in personnel is shown from examples such as the ground school training officer—1stLt James Butterworth, born in England, a veterinary surgeon in civil life, with more than 1600 hours in the air as a pilot.

While the squadron is still lacking its authorized strength in enlisted personnel, recent extensive recruiting methods have turned out remarkably well. Every effort has been made to utilize the newspapers and radio in the vicinity of Chicago to procure personnel in the enlisted ranks. A waiting list exists for pilots and because of this, all pilots chosen have measured up to the standards necessary for combat flying as well as Marine officers. The experience gained from our efforts to recruit enlisted personnel shows that the best procedure is for squadron members themselves to personally recruit individuals. An intensive drive along these lines has been carried out during the past two months and results are favorable.

The squadron as a unit of the Marine Air Reserve Training Command is fully equipped for combat duty and ready for call within the required 10 days.

Fighter Squadron 215, USMCR

VMF 215, MAD, NAS

Olathe, Kansas

LTCol H. E. King, USMCR, Commanding

RESERVE SQUADRON VMF 215 WAS ACTIVATED on the first of July, 1946, and since then has had experiences as varied and unusual, if not as harrowing, as those experienced by the original VMF 215 squadron during the war.



Pilots of VMF 121, operating out of Glenview, Illinois, are briefed before taking to the air. The squadron ably maintains and services all of their own aircraft.

Eight pilots who had been flying as volunteer reservists at the Naval Air Station, Olathe, formed the nucleus of the organization. They were the spark plugs of the organization, and their interest and drive still helps out in the tough spots and provides a seasoned core for an otherwise new and untried organization. With them, and more men like them who have joined up, the squadron is progressing at a steady rate, both in number and in its accomplishments.

The first problem was publicity. So a Corsair was flown from Olathe to Fairfax Airport and then pulled by tow truck through downtown Kansas City and parked in front of the court house. There was an exclusive escort of Kansas City cops—all former marines. A wooden ramp was placed across the wing of the aircraft so that the people could mount and look the plane over. This stunt rated a parade of near 10,000 people, and as they came our men were there to answer questions and point out features of the aircraft. Letters and telephone calls started coming into the detachment about the Marine Reserve program.

Navy Day provided another opportunity. With hundreds of visitors on the station the squadron

put on its best, and in addition was host to a Boy Scout troop. These Boy Scouts, Troop number 10 of Kansas City, have a former marine for their scoutmaster, and they had a twelve-year-old's consuming interest in aviation. From the time they hit the station it practically took one marine to one scout to keep track of them. In and out of airplanes, up to ship's service, up in the tower, in and out of the office—a general mad scramble, and millions of questions. Each scout was put in an airplane placed on jacks so he could raise and lower the wheels and flaps, and in general do everything but fly. Those scouts are still talking about their trip out here and looking forward to coming back, but after they left a thoroughly tired out sergeant was heard to say, "Cripes, we'll be pulling them out of the gun mounts for the next month."

In the Armistice Day parade the squadron was at it again. This time a float depicting the flag raising on Iwo Jima won compliments from the officials and spectators alike because of its convincing resemblance to the original and now famous photograph.

Those are special occasions, of course; the squadron keeps up a less spectacular but steady



VMF 215 of Olathe, Kansas, needed recruits. Hence, a parade and the Corsair parked in front of the courthouse in Kansas City. 10,000 people came to view the plane.

flow of publicity. Weekly radio broadcasts always bring results. The latest of these is a 15-minute spot on KCKN every Thursday at 1345 called "Marine Varieties." It is a popular request program with our Marine reporter giving a summary of the week's activities in the squadron and any new developments in the general Marine Reserve program.

A recruiting drive was coordinated with a Navy drive starting in February. A bus was equipped with complete information and materials for the actual enlistment of men into the reserve program. This bus spent time in all sections of Kansas City besides going to all the small towns in this area.

The net result of this program is that to date there are 44 pilots, 10 ground officers, and 1 flight surgeon, or a total of 55 officers. In the enlisted ranks, as a result of the drive, there are 128 marines plus three corpsmen, making a total of 131 enlisted men in the squadron.

At present the squadron is launching a full-scale training program for both pilots and enlisted men.

Our next problem in training is to convert the ex-Army and ex-Navy men and indoctrinate them in Marine methods. One ex-Army technical sergeant said when he finished this training he will be as salty as a private first class with a hash mark.

The training program divides into three groups: first enlistments, ex-Army and Navy personnel, and former marines. These are again broken down into aviation personnel and non-

aviation experienced. After the indoctrinations are completed and the inexperienced men become acquainted with aviation the squadron will be ready for the largest part of the training: specialized training in the technical fields such as engineering, hydraulics, radio, radar, etc. In most cases this will mean a complete course is necessary—from basic principles on through. Naturally this will take time and good instruction, but both are available, plus the equipment to do the work.

In addition to the study each man is assigned to a department and puts in some time each drill period working where he must apply what he has learned. They choose their own specialties, but the main thing they all want is to keep busy doing something, and the instructors make sure they do.

The pilots, of course, are flying. Every drill is devoted to syllabus training which has placed VMF 215 as one of the highest ranking squadrons in flight hours per month among the reserves. In addition to the routine flying they have been called upon to perform in a few air shows. In one instance air support was furnished for the maneuvers of a neighboring military academy. On Navy Day there was an air show with stunting exhibitions and all the trimmings. Civic centers call for air shows when dedicating new air fields and the pilots always come, regardless of time, to demonstrate their skill, that skill which enabled many of them to receive awards and make outstanding records in combat.

US 3 MC

New Developments

Shore Party . . .

● IN MAY'S *The New FMF* it was mentioned that the division pioneer battalion would be redesignated the shore party battalion. Actually, this new division-level shore party organization is a skeleton regiment. Although its normal size and its administration approximates that of a battalion, it is capable of being rapidly expanded to regimental strength.

The flexibility of the new regiment is in accord with the thoroughly tested axiom that the specific nature of an operation governs the exact organization of the shore party.

The basic unit of the shore party is the shore party company. Operationally, one shore party company is expected to support one reinforced infantry battalion or BLT.

At operational strength the shore party company consists of a temporary ship stevedore platoon to discharge the holds of one APA, a shore stevedore platoon to unload the landing craft at the beach line, and a dump stevedore platoon to work the beachhead supply points. The company headquarters includes an engineer equipment squad and a pioneer squad. The engineer equipment squad is equipped with two crawler-mounted revolving cranes, two trailer-mounted floodlights, two heavy tractors (TD-18s), and three medium tractors (TD-14s). The pioneer squad is capable of minor engineering work in the beach area: carpentry, rigging, demolition, sign painting, and so on.

When augmented, the shore stevedore platoon consists of two sections of five squads each. Each section could thus handle one unloading point: four squads unloading four landing craft while the fifth squad remains in reserve or is resting.

Following the same pattern, the dump stevedore platoon, when up to operational strength, contains two sections of three squads each. This provides for a squad in each of four dump areas with two squads in reserve. Permanent shore party personnel in the section headquarters will act as supervisors and checkers.

The ship stevedore platoon is a temporary unit activated only for exercises or operations. Its exact composition and strength depends on the type of ship being unloaded. In a typical situa-

tion where the shore party company is supporting a BLT which is being unloaded from a 5-hold APA, the ship stevedore platoon might consist of five squads of 12 men each. For special situations requiring boat-riders, additional personnel would have to be provided.

Normally, each shore party company will have a communications section attached. Other specialist units or personnel that might be added, depending on the nature of the landing, include medical, motor transport, engineer, military police, and navy beach party.

There are three shore party companies to a shore party battalion. The battalion's headquarters company will serve as a shore party group headquarters when two or more landing teams are being supported.

The shore party regiment consists of two shore party battalions plus a headquarters and service company and a shore stevedore company. The commanding officer of the shore party regiment, normally a colonel, will also be the division shore party commander.

The regimental headquarters and service company contains two platoons:

The communications platoon is an offshoot of the now-defunct assault signal company. It contains nine communications sections which allows one for each of the six shore party companies, one for each of the two shore party battalions, and one for the division shore party headquarters.

The equipment and transportation platoon groups all the regiment's heavy transportation. Subordinate shore party units, being confined primarily to the beach area, depend less on organic transportation than other units. Thus centralized control of transport is feasible and facilitates the meeting of changing requirements. The platoon has a secondary function of supervising equipment employment when centralized control is desired.

The shore stevedore company is a temporary organization which will serve as a labor pool.

The organization of a shore party for a Marine brigade parallels that of the division except, of course, in size. The shore party battalion of a Marine brigade will normally have a headquarters and service company and three shore party companies.

Shore Party Unit Strengths

(based on J(P) series T/Os)

Unit	T/O	Normal Allowance			Augmented Strength		
		officers	warrants	enlisted	officers	warrants	enlisted
Shore Party Regiment		34	4	573	77	8	2191
H&S Company	J-41-(P)	18	4	269	18	4	277
Regimental Headquarters		5	2	25	5	2	33
Communications Platoon		10	0	158	10	0	158
Equip&Trans Platoon		1	2	45	1	2	45
Medical Section (Navy)		1	0	15	1	0	26
Company Headquarters		1	0	26	1	0	26
Shore Stevedore Company	J-40-(P)	0	0	0	5	4	306
Shore Party Battalion¹		8	0	148	22	0	804
Headquarters Company	J-38-(P)	2	0	22	4	0	72
Shore Party Company²	J-36-(P)	2	0	42	6	0	244
Company Headquarters		2	0	24	3	0	28
Headquarters Section		2	0	3	3	0	7
Engineer Equip Squad		0	0	12	0	0	0
Pioneer Squad		0	0	9	0	0	9
Shore Stevedore Platoon ³		0	0	7	1	0	91
Platoon Headquarters		0	0	1	1	0	5
Shore Stevedore Section		0	0	3	0	0	43
Shore Stevedore Squad		0	0	0	0	0	8
Dump Stevedore Platoon ⁴		0	0	11	1	0	63
Platoon Headquarters		0	0	1	1	0	5
Dump Stevedore Section		0	0	5	0	0	29
Dump Stevedore Squad		0	0	0	0	0	8
Ship Stevedore Platoon ⁵		0	0	0	1	0	62
Platoon Headquarters		0	0	0	1	0	2
Ship Stevedore Squad		0	0	0	0	0	12

¹There are 2 Shore Party Battalions in a Shore Party Regiment.


²There are 3 Shore Party Companies in a Shore Party Battalion.

³A Shore Stevedore Platoon has 2 sections of 5 squads each.

⁴A Dump Stevedore Platoon has 2 sections of 3 squads each.

⁵A Ship Stevedore Platoon is a temporary unit. To unload a 5-hold APA, 5 squads of 12 men each might be used.

SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM OF A SHORE PARTY COMPANY SUPPORTING A BATTALION LANDING TEAM



Message Center

Fitness Reports . . .

DEAR SIR:

LtCol Drake's *Report on Fitness Reports* in the May issue of the GAZETTE contains certain very constructive criticisms of the present report on fitness forms which if followed should make such reports more valuable to the Marine Corps. To his suggested report on fitness I believe there should be added one item which would consist of two questions: (1) How many officers of this officer's rank are now serving under your command? (2) How do you rate this officer among them?

The result of incorporating these questions into the report on fitness would be to force command officers to give an unequivocal estimate of an officer's relative value compared to other officers of the same rank with whom he is serving. When a selection board examined the officer's record if it found that he was rated one out of three by one commanding officer, two out of nine by another, one out of five by still another and three out of eleven by a fourth, then his average rating in the fould mentioned reports would be 1.75 out of 7. He would thus be classed by his various commanding officers as among the best 25 per cent of his rank. On the other hand, if he had been rated three out of three, eight out of nine, four out of five, and eight out of eleven the average of his ratings would be 5.75 out of 7. He would thus be classed as among the lowest 25 per cent of his rank. By averaging an officer's ratings in this manner a selection board could obtain a very good idea as to the relative value of this officer compared to other officers of the same rank.

Some commanding officers may say that they can-

not rate their officers as called for by these questions because there are too many considerations to be taken into account; such as the duties being performed, length of service, age, etc., of the officers considered. To such an objection I have only one answer and that is that if these same commanding officers were ordered to effect successively the transfer of their officers that they could promptly give the order in which they wanted them to go and that order would be the officers' ratings in reverse.

Of course there would always be the chance that an excellent officer would have the misfortune to always serve with fair officers and so their relative value as taken from their reports on fitness would not be their true value. However, in most cases over a fairly long period of time an officer should serve with an average cross-section of the officers of his rank so that the average of the ratings given by his reporting seniors should be a fairly good gauge of his relative fitness.

I have been told by officers who have been members of selection boards that 90 per cent of the records which the board considered were "excellent" or better and that the board had great difficulty differentiating between officers because of the uniformly excellent reports on fitness which most commanding officers had given. The answers to these two questions would give the board something which they could use for a comparison of the officer's relative worth. I believe that the inclusion of these questions in the report on fitness would be worth while.

J. S. LETCHER,
Col, USMC.

From India . . .

GENTLEMEN:

. . . Since some time will elapse before you receive this letter and since I am very anxious not to miss the April and May issues of the magazine, I should appreciate your making my subscription effective as of the April issue. I realize that this is probably an unorthodox request which would not normally be granted, but I submit that mine is an unusual case warranting unusual action. Your letter arrived on 10 May here in Calcutta, having been received for for-

Each month the GAZETTE will pay five dollars for each letter printed. These pages are intended for comments and corrections on past articles and as a discussion center for pet theories, battle lessons, training expedients, and what have you. Signatures will be withheld if requested.

warding by the Foreign Service mail room on March 7. I am replying to it by return mail.

The GAZETTE is very welcome here. The American colony numbers about two hundred people of all ages. Of that number there are six Marine Corps Reserve officers. Since I am the only one who now receives the GAZETTE, my copy circulates among the other five, and eventually winds up in the United States Information Service Library, where numerous Indian Officers notice and read it through. The three books running serially in the GAZETTE at present are most interesting and I would be sorry to miss the April and May installments. . . .

JOHN W. THOMASON, III,
Major, USMCR.

More on Boots . . .

DEAR SIR:

I thought that Maj P. D. Carleton's article *Case for Better Gear* in the May issue was a point well taken. As the author said, it is a subject curiously neglected, and we could well take more cognizance of such matters so that our weapons and equipment in the Corps will keep pace with the development of present warfare.

Also I'd like to put in my two cents for the Army's combat shoe or "cuffed off boot" which the major says so many marines eagerly sought after.

DEAN N. McDOWELL,
Captain, USMC.

Underseas Transport . . .

DEAR SIR:

In *The New FMF*, May GAZETTE, Conclusion—new methods of transport—including air and submarine.

Having worked as a Marine raider with submarines in this war, submarines will not work as assault transports "until" those in command stop trying to use a combat submarine for this work.

The same must be done by the submarine as was with the destroyer. The equivalent of the APD is what we want to work with.

ELZY KEES, JR.,
TSgt, USMC.

ED: The Navy is now experimenting with suitable types of transport submarines.

They are almost gone . . .

Combat Photos

Only because our stocks are just about gone are we offering these contact prints of genuine battle photographs by U. S. Marine combat photographers at these reduced prices. These are real action shots printed on heavy, glossy paper.

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Answers to Facts and Figures

on page 32

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The Washington Riot

By Capt Lewis Meyers

THE USE OF MARINES to preserve order during an election does not sound remarkable. Such an assignment could have occurred in almost any Caribbean country. But just 90 years ago two companies of marines, headed by the Commandant himself, faced weapons ranging from slingshots to a cannon so that citizens would be able to vote—in Washington, D. C.

This startling situation in the capital city arose in June 1857 when the Know-Nothing Party imported (from Baltimore) a gang of thugs to keep the honest voters away from the polls. They drove off the police in the Fourth Ward and then turned to on their political mission.

Washington's Mayor Magruder asked the President for a company of marines to keep the peace. At 1300 a mob from the Fifth Ward streamed up Pennsylvania Avenue dragging a small brass cannon. At the same time two companies of marines, under Capt H. B. Tyler, marched to City Hall. Tyler, who later became the Adjutant and Inspector of the Corps and then resigned to join the Confederacy, had two company commanders who distinguished themselves in the California campaign of the Mexican War: Brevet Maj Jacob Zeilin, a future Commandant, and Capt Ward Maddox. The marching column was hooted all along the way; passing the mob with the cannon the marines were warned, loudly and repeatedly, that none of them would return to the Navy Yard alive.

The city authorities dispatched the troops to the polls, which had been closed for some time. Coming to order arms, they faced a large crowd in the middle of the street. This mob had the cannon and spokesmen declared it would be fired into the ranks unless the marines withdrew. Tyler's answer was an advance on the cannon.


Gen Archibald Henderson, the CMC, was present, dressed in civilian clothes. When the Marine right flank was almost opposite the gun, he went up to the cannon and leaned against the muzzle, so the piece could not be fired at the troops. To the mob at the gun Gen Henderson addressed a rather striking understatement: "Men, you had better think twice before you fire this piece at the marines." Warning them that the troops' muskets were loaded with ball, he advised any lingering would-be voters to leave the area.

The Commandant then crossed the street to Capt Tyler and ordered the gun taken at once. Several pistol shots were fired at Gen Henderson, some from close range, before one of Tyler's platoons charged the cannon on the double, seized it, and began to haul it across the street. By now revolvers were popping as in an Errol Flynn movie and one of the mob, to make sure of his aim, ran up within a yard of the Commandant. Before the man could fire, a private clubbed his musket and knocked the revolver to the ground; the General collared his assailant and turned him over to the Mayor. The pistol shots were rattling "like hailstones," according to the press, and Tyler and his officers had trouble holding the fire of the troops.

The mob's slingshots were proving accurate and stones were hitting the marines. Finally one of the pistol marksmen settled down and shot a marine in the face. The troops then opened fire until stopped by their officers. The companies were reformed in ranks and remained standing in the street while the sniping continued until a private was hit in the shoulder. At this the marines raised their pieces as if to fire a volley and the mob fled.

The two companies were ordered back to the City Hall and then marched to the depot to head off any possible reinforcements coming from Baltimore to continue the riot.

US MC



Travelogue

By Howard Haynes



With plaudits galore and a deafening roar,
The earth-rocket shot toward the moon;
Past ruddy-faced Mars up the path to the stars
Sped the good ship "Galloping Goon."
And seated inside—we now can confide—
Were men ranking high in the arts;
Prolific, scientific, with brain power terrific,
Busy wrestling with data and charts.

The problem involved was about to be solved:
The man in the moon—who is he?
Sharp-witted sages throughout the dark ages
Had pondered the thing until dizzy:
But Science today shouted, "Gadgets away!
We'll bring it right under control."
No Doubting Thomas, nor old Nostradamus
Ever challenged a worthier goal.

At last, as moon-parked, the crew disembarked
To go hunting for fauna and flora;
There came a surprise, one stared with bugged eyes,
Exclaiming, "Hieroglyphics, Begorra!"
To report the event, this message was sent:
"We've taken a jolt on the chin here.
Our experts translated an inscription which stated,
'The MARINES and Kilroy have been here!'"

